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Testing Japan's Convictions:
The Lay Judge System and the
Rights of Criminal Defendants
Arne F. Soldwedel*

ABSTRACT

Japan has endured considerable international and
domestic criticism over the way its criminaljustice system treats
criminal defendants. The system shows little regard for
defendants' constitutional rights, and media reports about
forced confessions and wrongful convictions are creating
grassroots pressures to uphold the right to counsel, the right to
silence, and the presumption of innocence.
Japan has begun to reform its legal system in order to
increase public participationin government, and to create more
public trust in the justice system. To achieve these aims, Japan
will reintroducejury trials in May of 2009. However, current
Japanesejustice reforms ignorepolice practices and specifically
reject the promotion of defendants' rights.
As a result, current reforms are unlikely to achieve their
ambitious goals. Instead, they may trigger a governmental
legitimacy crisis. Japan must modify its criminal proceduresso
that they agree with the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants if it truly hopes to increase participation in
government and to instill faith in the justice system.

* L.L.M. Candidate, Temple University School of Law, Tokyo, Japan, 2010; J.D.,

Western New England College School of Law, 2007. The Author extends his gratitude
to Dean Matthew J. Wilson of the Temple University School of Law, Japan Campus, for
his guidance and critiques. The Author also thanks Mr. Marcus Kosins, Jr., Esq., for
providing material and Mr. Neal Eriksen, Esq., for reviewing the project. Any opinions
expressed herein are the Author's own, as are any mistakes or inaccuracies.
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Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority
for which is derived from the people, the powers of which
are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the
benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.
Constitutionof Japan,May 3, 1947, from the Preamble

I. INTRODUCTION

Japan experienced an extended economic downturn in the 1990s
that forced the country to implement creative solutions to promote
recovery. 1 To meet these economic pressures and the perceived need
to "compete internationally," Japan embarked on a massive program
of governmental reform 2 aimed at streamlining bureaucracy and
cutting costs on a grand scale. 3 As part of this change, reformers also
sought to revise the legal system. 4 Japan's legal system has been
broadly criticized as an insular bureaucracy that is detached from the
needs of the people. 5 In particular, both foreign and domestic
observers have vilified Japanese criminal justice.6 The conviction

1.
See KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING: THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE
POWER AND PURPOSE 363-66 (2007) (providing a general discussion of pressures to
reform Japanese government between 1991 and 2006); Setsuo Miyazawa, Reform in
Japanese Legal Education: The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law
at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 89, 97 (2001); Matthew Wilson, The Dawn of
Criminal Jury Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WISC. INT'L L.J. 835, 842
(2007).
2.
George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in Japan
and What Japan'sNew Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 47980 (2006) (noting that a decade of economic woes has driven the Japanese government
toward structural reforms of the legal system and the role of lawyers in Japanese
society). See also Wilson, supranote 1, at 842.
3.
Miyazawa, supra note 1, at 97-98; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Gist of the Central Government Reform, http://www.mofa.go.jp/abouthq/
central.gov/gist.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2007); see also Wilson, supra note 1, at 842
(noting the amendments of the Commercial Code in 1993, the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1994, the Product Liability Act in 1995, the implementation of a new
Code of Civil Procedure in 1998, and the revision of the Commercial Code in 2002 as
examples of reform).
4.
See, e.g., PROMOTION OFFICE OF JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE OF JAPAN, JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM OF JAPAN-FOR A FASTER, FRIENDLIER,
AND MORE RELIABLE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2006), availableat http://www.moj.go.jpl
ENGLISH/issuesissues0l.html [hereinafter Justice System Reform Pamphlet]; see also
Wilson, supra note 1, at 842-43.
5.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 835-36.
6.
See, e.g., Takeo Ishimatsu, Are Criminal Defendants in Japan Truly
Receiving Trials by Judges?, translated in 22 L. JAPAN 143, 143 (1989) (arguing that
criminal trials in Japan are formal ceremonies that exist only as an "empty shell"); see
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rate in Japan stands at over 99%,7 and some methods of handling and
processing the accused have drawn the attention of diverse bodies
such as the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 8 human rights
groups, 9 and the United Nations. 10 Media reports about wrongful
convictions are mobilizing the Japanese citizenry, and public
sentiment may also be contributing to the movement to revise the
criminal justice system.'1
In 1999, the government established the Justice System Reform
Council (JSRC) to recommend appropriate modifications of the legal
system. 12 The JSRC deliberated for two years and, in June 2001,
issued its recommendations to the Cabinet. 13 The JSRC proposed

also Ryuichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current Criminal Procedure, translated in 22 L.
JAPAN 129, 129 (1989) (arguing that Japan's Code of Criminal Procedure is "diseased,"
and that Japanese courts do not perform the function of deciding guilt or innocence, but
rather "confirm guilt"). Ishimatsu's and Hirano's unapologetic criticisms of the
Japanese system are underscored by their professional qualifications. Ishimatsu was a
former high court judge with a long career trying many criminal cases, and Hirano was
a noted criminal procedure scholar and a former Tokyo University president. Hirano,
supra, at 129 Ishimatsu, supra, at 143; see also Wilson, supra note 1, at 835-37
(summarizing the main aspects of the Japanese criminal justice system that various
observers have critiqued).
7.
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why is the Japanese Conviction
Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 55 (2001) (arguing that understaffing and budget
constraints among prosecutors impact the cases that are selected for trial).
8.
See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ABOLISH "DAIYO-KANGOKUJAPAN POLICE CUSTODY SYSTEM" Now (1993) [hereinafter ABOLISH DAiYO-KANGOKU].
9.
See Jeff Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments:
Human Rights Abuses and the Japanese Penal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329,
371 (2003) (noting that groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International have criticized Japan for more than ten years).
10.
See U.N. Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Committee Against Torture: Japan, CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007); see also Press
Release, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, UN Torture Committee: Japan's
Substitute Prison System Must Be Reconsidered Immediately Following the
Committee's Recommendations (May 30, 2007), availableat http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/
en/activities/meetings/070530.html [hereinafter U.N. Committee Recommendations].
Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan,28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
11.
35, 47 (2006) (noting the uproar over the cases of four wrongfully convicted individuals
who had been sentenced to death row and who served a combined 130 years of
incarceration before their sentences were overturned, and that, as a result, the Chief
Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court investigated the idea of re-implementing a jury
system in Japan); see also Daniel H. Foote, From Japan's Death Row to Freedom, 1
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 11 (1992) [hereinafter Foote, Death Row].
12.
Ministry of Justice of Japan, Ensuring that the Results of the Justice
System Reform Take Root, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues0l.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Ensuring Justice] (discussing that the Diet enacted
the Act for the Establishment of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC) and the
JSRC was attached to the Cabinet in 1999).
13.
The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice
System Reform Council: For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century
(2001), reprinted in 2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 126, available at
[hereinafter
JSRC
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/O612report.html
Recommendations]; see also Ensuring Justice, supra note 12.
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three main elements to guide Japanese legal reform: construction of a
justice system meeting the people's needs, reform of the judicial
14
community, and establishment of a "popular base.'
More specifically, the first element involved changing the civil
procedure system in order to create greater access to the Japanese
justice system. 15 The second element focused on modifying the
training and education of judges, and it included changes in legal
education. 16 The third element of legal reform was the introduction
of a lay judge system or saiban-in seido, requiring citizen
participation in serious criminal trials.' 7 The JSRC proposed the lay
judge system in order to achieve greater citizen participation in
government 18 and to instill faith in the justice system. 19 Public
involvement in the adjudication of crime is expected to improve public
20
perceptions of the Japanese criminal justice system's legitimacy.
Scholars have noted that motives for implementing this new system
also include promoting democracy, 21 and contributing to the
perception that disputes in Japan are resolved fairly. 22 However,
Japan's "specific motives ... d[id] not include [the] promotion of
defendants' rights. '23 Moreover, current reform initiatives do not
modify Japanese police procedures, which some observers believe to
24
be the essential element of any true reform.
To date, the Japanese government has not adopted any reform
measures that go substantially beyond those recommended in the

14.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 132.
15.
Id. at 137.
16.
Id. at 174-91.
17.
Id. at 213-20.
18.
Id. at 211-12.
19.
Id. at 212.
20.
See Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese
Justice System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System
(Saiban-in Seido) from Domestic Historical and International Psychological
Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935, 943 (2004) (noting that the Japanese
judiciary is seen as elitist and removed from everyday life and the belief that laypeople,
who posses common sense but are without institutional pressures and personal or
political stakes in the outcomes of cases, are best suited to temper the insularity and
biases of Japanese judges).
21.
Id.
22.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 50-51.
23.
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 20, at 941 (noting that the JSRC has
specifically excluded defendants' rights as a rationale for reform).
24.
See, e.g., David T. Johnson, Justice System Reform in Japan: Where Are the
Police and Why Does it Matter?, at 2, http://www.law.usyd.edu.aulanjel/documents/
ResearchPublications/Johnson2004_JusticeSystemReform.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Justice System Reform] (noting that Japanese criminal
justice is one of the principal indicators of the character of Japan's democracy, and that
the police practices should have been the central focus of criminal justice reform, but
that reform officials have neglected to consider the police in the discourse).
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JSRC Report, 2 5 and in May 2009, Japan will reintroduce jury trials
after a sixty-three-year absence. 26 The JSRC Report leaves the
impression that Japan is committed to increasing citizen
participation. 27 Yet because current initiatives do not address
defendants' constitutional rights, and because they ignore police
practices, Japan may be missing its best opportunity to achieve truly
meaningful reform, and the lay judge system may not support the
reformers' ambitious goals. Some critics argue that the lay judge
system is actually a deliberate obfuscation designed to give the
appearance of legitimacy. 28 As a result, questions remain about the
scope and efficacy of the proposed reforms.
This Article will focus on the implementation of citizen
participation through jury trials and on what current Japanese legal
reforms will mean for the rights of criminal defendants. Japanese
society is becoming more adversarial in nature, 29 and as public
awareness of current law enforcement practices grows, Japanese
people may demand more complete reforms in order to uphold the
By providing an
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
infrastructure for citizen participation, the new lay judge system
could provide a gateway for that to happen. Part II sets forth the
30
basic framework and goals of the proposed lay judge (saibanin)
system. Part III introduces the Japanese approach to criminal

25.
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 20, at 992 (noting in an addendum to their
article that the codification of the recommendations involves only minor changes to the
number of jurors).
26.
Wilson, supra note 1, at 837; see also Joseph J. Kodner, Re-introducing Lay
Participationto Japanese Criminal Cases: An Awkward Yet Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (2003) (providing a history of Japan's early
experiences with a jury system that had been established between 1928 and 1943
under the 1923 Jury Act).
27.
See John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human
Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 87-91, 155 (2006) (studying forty-six
countries in Eastern Europe, the authors note various arguments that lay adjudication
can help promote civil and political rights and prevent state repression, and that
judges may have little choice to uphold constitutional provisions because they are
accountable to the legal system).
28.
See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Prospects for Citizen Participationin Criminal
Trials in Japan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 363, 366 (2006) (book review) (citing
TAKASHI MARUTA, SAIBAN'IN SEIDO [THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM] 43 (2004)) (noting that
the "real goal" may be to create the appearance of civic participation).
29.
See Gordon Van Kessel, European Trends Toward Adversary Styles in
Criminal Procedure and Evidence, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT:
CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS, at 225, 243 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo
Miyazawa eds., 2002) (noting that Japan is moving toward a more individualistic
society with more economic and social competition). But see Bloom, supra note 11, at
56-57 (noting that the Japanese have a high level of respect for authority, and that the
social hierarchy stratifying Japan makes citizen participation less suitable there
because Japanese are more comfortable having cases decided by professional judges).
30.
The new citizen-judge system (saibanin seido) has been translated in
various ways, including: "lay judge," 'lay jury," or "lay assessor." This Article will use
the term "lay judges."
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justice, contrasts it with the U.S. approach, and compares Japanese
constitutional and procedural protections for criminal defendants
with current Japanese law enforcement practices. Part IV addresses
the potential impact of recent legal reforms on the Japanese criminal
justice system, to assess whether the lay judge system is likely to
meet the goals of reform.
Part V provides supplemental
recommendations to support more extensive and meaningful reform.
II. THE

SAIBANIN SYSTEM: DRESSING UP THE WINDOW OR
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR REAL REFORM?

There is considerable debate as to what the lay judge system will
actually achieve. 31 On May 28, 2004, the Japanese Diet promulgated
the Lay Assessor's Act, 32 which codified many of the
recommendations of the JSRC Report and set forth the structure of
the new system. The lay judge system is heavily modeled on
European mixed jury or lay judge systems, 33 which feature private
citizens sitting alongside professional judges on adjudicatory
panels. 34 Panels for contested cases will consist of six lay judges and
three professional judges. 35 In uncontested cases-cases in which a
confession has been obtained-panels will consist of four lay judges
and one professional judge. 36 Decisions in either situation will
require a majority vote that includes the vote of at least one
professional judge.3 7 Lay judges will help to determine not only the
guilt or innocence of defendants, but also the sentences of those who
are convicted. 38 Lay judges will participate in trials featuring serious
cases punishable by death, life imprisonment, imprisonment for an
indefinite period, and imprisonment with hard labor, as well as trials
of crimes involving an intentional act that resulted in the death of a

31.
See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 11 (arguing that the lay judge system will not
meet its stated goals).
32.
Saiban'in no Sanka Suru Keiji Saiban ni kansuru Horitsu [Law for
Implementation of Lay Judge System in Criminal Court Procedures], Law No. 63 of
2004, translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan's Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in)
Law: An Annotated Translationof the Act Concerning Participationof Lay Assessors in
Criminal Trials, 6 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 233, 233 (2005). This law will be referred to
as the "Lay Assessor's Act" for the purposes of this article.
33.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 42; see also Wilson, supra note 1, at 852
(noting the Japanese Supreme Court, an early opponent of the new system, was less
opposed to implementing the European-style lay judge system than it was to the
adoption of a U.S.-style jury system).
34.
Bloom, supra note 11, at 39.
35.
Anderson & Nolan, supranote 20, at 992.
36.
Id.
37.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 234.
38.
Id. at 240-41.
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victim. 3 9 Lay judges will also be able to ask questions of victims
42
41
directly, 40 and indirectly of witnesses and defendants at trial.
Prospective lay judges will be selected from lists of registered
voters 43 and must undergo questioning by the court as to their
capacity for fair decision making and their involvement with the
events at issue in the case. 44 They may be ineligible for various
reasons such as advanced age, criminal history, failure to complete
mandatory Japanese education, membership in government, mental

or physical incapacity, and employment status. 45 In addition, those
with serious illnesses, those who need to care for family members,
those who will suffer severe financial difficulty, and those who must
46

attend a family funeral may also be excused from service.
The JSRC Report recommended that lay judges serve in cases
involving serious crimes to which heavy statutory penalties apply,
because these are the cases "in which the general public has a strong
interest and that have a strong impact on society. ' 47 The Lay
Assessor's Act upheld this recommendation by providing that lay
judges will consider cases involving grave offenses and the possibility
of harsh punishments.48
The report also recommended that
defendants not be allowed to waive trial by a judicial panel partly
comprised of lay judges. 49
The Lay Assessor's Act does not
specifically uphold this recommendation, but instead provides that

39.
Id. at 236-37.
40.
Id. at 268 (stating that under Article 58 of the Lay Assessor's Act, lay
judges may question victims who have stated their opinions during the proceedings in
order to clarify the meaning of their testimony.).
41.
Id. at 267 (stating that under Article 56 of the Lay Assessor's Act, lay
judges may question a witness or other person upon informing the chief judge; and
under Article 57, lay judges may attend questioning sessions of witnesses and others
that are held outside court and, upon informing the chief judge, may also ask questions
on these occasions).
42.
Id. at 268 (stating that under Article 59 of the Lay Assessor's Act, upon
informing the chief judge, lay judges may question defendants who make voluntary
statements).
43.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 243 (discussing Article 13 of the Lay
Assessor's Act); id. at 249 (discussing Article 21 of the Lay Assessor's Act).
44.
Id. at 248 (stating that Article 17 of the Lay Assessor's Act stipulates
reasons for disqualification including those with some relation to the case); id. at 25657 (stating that Article 34 of the Lay Assessor Act provides that the chief judge may
ask lay judges questions regarding their suitability for service); Justice System Reform
Pamphlet, supra note 4, at 14.
45.
Wilson, supra note 1, at 846 (citing Sup. Ct. of Japan, SAIBANIN SENIN
TETSUZUKI NO GAIYo [Outline of Lay Judge Selection Process], available at
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/shiryo/pdf/09.pdf).
46.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 247 (stating that Article 16 of the Lay
Assessor's Act outlines reasons why one may decline service as a lay judge).
47.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 216.
48.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 237.
49.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 216 (noting that this policy is
consistent with the aim of increasing citizen participation in government-as
defendants cannot opt for bench trials, their cases must be heard by lay judges).
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professional judges may decide cases where conditions make it
difficult to guarantee lay judge participation.5 0 Finally, the current
system of koso appeals is to remain intact.5 1 This means that under
the new lay judge system, prosecutors will retain the power to retry
individuals they were unable to convict in the court of first instance,
despite the Japanese constitution's prohibition on "double
jeopardy. '52
Notably, the JSRC Report shied away from
recommending that lay judges also participate in the appeals
process, 53 and the Lay Assessor's Act did not take up the issue.
The basic structure of the new system appears to support the
general goal of increasing public involvement in government affairs.
However, the current system falls short of the ambitious aims set
forth in the JSRC Report. In recommending a mixed jury system, the
JSRC stated that the new system should be flexible, 54 "constantly
monitored and.., readjusted from a broad viewpoint, as
necessary." 55 Perhaps the JSRC intended the new system to function
as a temporary program that will lay the groundwork for more
extensive legal reforms. If so, the form this will take remains to be
seen, because the government's current approach will not increase
faith in the justice system. Some observers argue that Japan should
adopt U.S.-style jury trials as a more appropriate vehicle to produce

50.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 238 (stating that Article 3 of the Lay
Assessor's Act provides for exceptions to the types of cases lay judges will participate
in; for example, an exception is provided for cases involving a possibility of violent
reprisals against lay judges by elements of organized crime).
51.
KEISHOHO, Law No. 131 of 1948, arts. 372-404, translated in EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 2600-2601, at 90-95 (2007). It should be noted that the Lay Assessor's
Act does not mention the issue of appealing a determination by the lay judges, but the
JSRC Report does. See JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that
koso appeals are available to both the defense and the prosecution); Supreme Court of
Japan, Outline of Criminal Justice in Japan, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
proceedings/criminal-justice.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Outline].
A party who is not content with the judgment of the first instance may file an
appeal, which is called a Koso appeal .. . alleging an error. Grounds for a Koso
appeal are: (i) non-compliance with procedural code in the trial proceedings;
(ii) an error in the interpretation or application of law in the judgment;
(iii) excessive severity or leniency of the sentence; and (iv) an error in factfinding.
Outline, supra.
52.
KENPO, art. 39 ("No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which
was lawful at the time it was committed or for an act of which he has been acquitted,
nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy."). While the Constitution, at least on paper,
prohibits "double jeopardy," in Japan this right does not attach until the judicial
process has achieved a "final" judgment.
53.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 217 ("Further studies are
necessary with regard to the composition of the court body for the koso appeal, the
method of proceedings, etc.").
54.
Id. at 213.
55.
Id.

1426

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41.1417

56
"better justice" and to instill greater faith in the judicial process.
Perhaps the flexibility alluded to in the JSRC Report would
eventually permit an U.S.-style jury system.
However, the
government has not significantly altered criminal procedures, and in
implementing the Lay Assessor's Act, it focused solely on achieving
citizen participation in criminal trials. 57 Neither the report nor the
law contemplates a fuller recognition of criminal defendants'
constitutional rights. Some critics argue that because Japanese
police practices have not been included in reform proposals,5 8 the lay
judge system is actually a meaningless facade that will not
59
significantly change Japanese criminal justice.
The Lay Assessor's Act was implemented to increase public
understanding, trust, and confidence, 60 but Japanese media reports
about wrongful convictions and forced confessions 6 1 are having the

56.
Richard 0. Lempert, Citizen Participationin Judicial Decision Making.
Juries, Lay Judges and Japan, 2001 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1, 13
(advocating a U.S.-style jury system to facilitate better justice, particularly regarding
criminal procedure); see also Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 283 (1999) (advocating a jury system based on the AngloAmerican model).
57.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 283. The authors cited ripp5 riya
(legislative reasons) that are not part of the law, but which provide the legislature's
rationale for introducing the legislation:
In light of the fact that having lay assessors selected from among the people
participating along with judges in the criminal litigation process will contribute
to raising the public's trust in and increasing their understanding of the
judicial system, it is necessary to prescribe special provisions in the Courts Act,
Code of Criminal Procedure, and other necessary areas to achieve lay assessors'
participation in criminal trials. Thus, this draft is introduced for these reasons.
Id.
58.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that public
discussion about reform is inadequate because it does not consider the role of the
police); id. at 15 (questioning why deliberations concerning justice system reform are
not transparent to the public)
59.
Id.; see also Jones, supra note 28, at 365-66 (noting the skepticism of
Professor Takashi Maruta); Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Learns Dreaded Task of Jury
Duty, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
07/16/world/asia/16jury.html?ex=1342324800&en=7b98b617do628fea&ei=5124&partne
r=permalink&exprod=permalink (citing Japanese defense attorney Shunkichi
Takayama who believes that "the jurors will be ornaments" that are "co-opted by the
state").
60.
Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 236 (stating that Article 1 of the Lay
Assessor's Act sets forth the purpose of the legislation).
61.
See, e.g., Defendant's Confession Rejected After DVD Viewing, YOMIURI
SHIMBUN (ToKYO), Nov. 16, 2007, at 2 (noting the judge's determination that a DVD
recording of the interrogation of an eighty-eight-year-old murder suspect revealed that
the prosecution misled the defendant and that the voluntary nature of the questioning
was therefore questionable); see also Kazuaki Nagata, Ex-Judge Continues to Push to
Free Death-Row Inmate He Helped Convict in '68, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, available
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007llO8f3.html
(noting the judge's
reservations about the methods police interrogators employed, and a lawyer's criticism

2008]

TESTING JAPANS CONVICTIONS

opposite effect-increasing public awareness of misapplications of
justice. 62 Under the focused lens of public scrutiny, police activities
that contradict the Japanese constitution could endanger the reform
movement's broad goals and raise questions about the government's
legitimacy. Citizens will not be encouraged by a jury trial system
that aims to build public approval but which also ignores the
Japanese constitution. Unless current law enforcement methods and
court proceedings are tempered to accord with the constitution,
Japanese citizens may disregard the lay judge system as an
unpopular and meaningless distraction. This would decrease, rather
than increase, trust in government and would discourage citizen
participation in government.
III. JAPAN'S CONSTITUTION AND THE SEARCH FOR "THE TRUTH"

To a Western observer, Japanese criminal justice methods are
out of step with the Japanese constitutional rights that exist to
protect criminal defendants. Japan's constitution has strong Western
influences, yet the country has retained its criminal justice
historical
and
the cultural
Understanding
traditions. 63
underpinnings of the Japanese experience helps to explain the
discord. Cultural relativism, however, should not be used to justify
inappropriate practices such as coercive interrogations and forced
confessions. These practices undermine governmental legitimacy and
should be strictly abandoned. The following subparts illustrate how
the Japanese criminal justice system routinely disregards the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
A. Modern Constitutionand the Japanese Concept
of Individual Rights
Japan has a long history, and not surprisingly its traditional
notions of the meaning of rights have had a strong impact on its
criminal justice system. Much of the tradition was turned on its head
in the aftermath of World War II, when General Douglas MacArthur

of the heavy reliance by prosecutors on confessions, regardless of how they are
produced); Setsuko Kamiya, Videotaping Interrogations Worth a Look?, JAPAN TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007lOl lfl.html.
62.
Amid Calls for Transparency Cops Plan Internal Monitors of Grillings,
JAPAN TIMEs, Nov. 2, 2007 [hereinafter Cops Plan Monitors], available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071102a4.html (noting the effect of media
reports of a series of acquittals involving forced confessions).
63.
See Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan:A Story
of New Wine in Old Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 210 (1994) (noting that Japan's
culture and traditions are not in harmony with legal norms that govern behavior there,
and that human rights are interpreted more in line with Japanese culture and
traditions than the Western interpretation of them).
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became the chief architect of the reconstruction of Japan and its legal
system. 64
As Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP),
MacArthur sought to impose U.S.-influenced liberal democratic
principles on Japan, and these were reflected in Japan's new
constitution. 65 The constitution contains provisions meant to protect
the criminally accused, many of which are directly analogous, if not
almost identical, to provisions in the U.S. Constitution. 66 SCAP
insisted on the inclusion of these provisions in the Japanese
constitution regardless of Japanese legal traditions. 6 7 While some
critics argue that the current Japanese Constitution is illegitimate
because it is not of purely Japanese origin, 68 it is notable that Japan
69
has never revised its constitution.
The Japanese constitution provides broad protections for those
accused of crimes. 70 Unfortunately, the most striking aspect of these
provisions is that they are routinely ignored. Even though the
constitution protects rights consistent with U.S. notions of justice,
Japan's understanding of individual rights remains distinct from the
U.S. understanding. 7 1 In fact, the term "right" did not even exist in

64.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 841.
65.
See PYLE, supra note 1, at 219 (noting that the occupation forces planted
the seeds of Western liberalism wherever they could and sought to implant U.S. values
and ideals without understanding Japan's history or culture because they considered
U.S. ideals to be universally valid); id. at 48 (noting that the United States imposed the
1947 Constitution on the Japanese); see also JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT:
JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 370 (1999) (noting the political idealism of the
United States and its influence on the Japanese Constitution).
66.
For example, provisions in Chapter III strongly resemble the U.S.
Constitution's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compare KENPo, arts. 3134, 37-39, with U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.
67.
See Takashi Takano, The Miranda Experience in Japan, in THE JAPANESE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS, supra note 29, at
128, 128-29 (noting safeguards against abuses to individual rights proposed in the
GHQ (General Headquarters) draft of the constitution, including one identical to a
clause in the U.S. Fifth Amendment; indicating that the second clause to Art. 38 in the
GHQ draft was revolutionary at the time because it stipulated that confessions would
only be valid if made in the presence of counsel-some twenty years before the
landmark Miranda v. Arizona decision in the U.S.; noting that the language was
altered at the suggestion of General Whitney of the GHQ, who felt it was too broad;
and stating that the adopted version omits the presence of counsel requirement).
68.
PYLE, supra note 1, at 48 (noting the sentiments of Japanese social scientist
Yasusuke Murakami, including the observation that, "for their entire modern history
the Japanese people have been compelled to live in world where the transcendental,
abstract values of Western civilization, rather than the familiar norms of their own
value system, ruled").
69.
DOWER, supra note 65, at 561-62 (noting that since its inception in 1947,
Japan's Constitution has never been revised in any way).
70.
See Takano, supra note 67, at 128.
71.
KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN
JAPAN 32 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that concepts such as "law" and "rights" in Japan gain
meaning in a situational context, and that governance in Japan is achieved by setting
norms to guide society instead of by establishing universal rules to apply in advance of
those situations).

20081

TESTING JAPANS CONVICTIONS

1429

Japan until it was introduced into the Japanese language during the
Meiji years as Japan sought to adapt to a new civil code. 72 In
addition to the cultural aspect, Japan's adherence to civil law is
another important factor in how rights are viewed in Japan. 73 In civil
law systems, rights emanate from legal documents and are not
universal principles that exist outside the codified law. 74
For
example, Article 11 of the Japanese constitution provides for
"fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution" that are to be "conferred to the people. '75 Under a civil
code approach, the codified law is the source of rights, whereas under
76
the U.S. view, rights exist apart from the Constitution.
The incorporation of U.S. ideals into the Japanese constitution
has yet to dislodge traditional Japanese notions of rights. 77 This
Japanese view of individual rights helps foreign observers to
understand why Japanese law enforcement practices appear to
contradict the Japanese constitution. Rights in Japan are a product
of Japanese culture and traditions, which have developed over
thousands of years of history. 78
Postwar Japan accepted U.S.
principles into its constitution and into its system of government, but
implementing these principles has been problematic because
Japanese criminal procedures do not wholeheartedly embrace the
constitution. 79 Moreover, while both the U.S. and Japanese criminal

72.
Id. (noting that the Japanese translator of the French Civil Code had to
fashion the term henri for an adequate translation because the historical Japanese
view of rights was contextual and situational as distinguished from the Western
understanding of rights).
73.
Id.
74.
See Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 1591, 1596 (1992) (noting the "civil law conception of the written law as the sole
source of private law"); id. at 1598 (noting that "in the civil law rights derive from the
substantive law, and wherever that law recognizes a right, the procedural law, being
accessory to the substantive law, must provide an appropriate remedy").
75.
KENPO, art. 11 ("The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the
fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people
by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations
as eternal and inviolate rights.").
76.
U.S CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
This language implies that U.S. citizens have other rights beyond those guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution.
77.
Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 210.
78.
See Frank Munger, Constitutional Reform, Legal Consciousness, and
Citizen Participationin Thailand, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 460 (2007) (noting that
Asian cultures socialize individuals in different ways than in the West, for cultural
reasons and because Asian cultures are "civil societies," and that reconstructing those
societies on a Western model may be misguided); see also Ramlogan, supra note 63, at
210.
79.
Munger, supra note 78, at 456 (noting that the transplantation of Western
judicial systems in Asian societies has resulted in systems that function quite
differently than their Western models).
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justice systems exist to control crime, the two systems approach
criminal justice in very different ways.
B. Competing Views of Justice
Japan has been characterized as a system of "substantive
justice," in contrast with the "procedural justice" system of the United
States.80 The hallmarks of substantive justice are the pursuit of
truth and the achievement of a "just result."'' l Accordingly, Japanese
criminal procedures are designed to uncover the truth as a necessary
first step in the justice process.8 2 The successes of the Japanese
criminal justice system, such as the low crime rate, the high
clearance rate of criminal cases, and the relatively small prison
83
population all indicate that the system successfully controls crime.
This justifies and supports Japanese law enforcement practices as
effective measures to combat crime.
However, during criminal
investigations, police and prosecutors place great importance on the
process of obtaining confessions, regardless of whether suspects'
rights are violated in the process.8 4 This is a significant problem
because sacrificing citizens' individual rights challenges the
legitimacy of the Japanese constitution and undermines the very
concept of democracy.
At the same time, Japanese criminal justice has also been
described as "benevolent" and "paternalistic" because it is geared
85
towards the expeditious reintegration of the guilty back into society.
Under this view, criminal justice is applied on an individual basis
rather than as a system of universal legal principles.8 6 Japanese
authorities have great discretion in determining which cases to
prosecute, and they exercise that discretion by thoroughly examining
all of the circumstances surrounding a criminal offense. 8 7 Under the

80.
Jean Choi DeSombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S.
Criminal Justice System: An Examination of PretrialRights of the CriminallyAccused
in Japan and the United States, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 103 (1995).
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 107.
83.
Cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 836-37 (noting that Japan is proud of its
judicial system and that the judiciary does not consider it in need of repair).
84.
David A. Seuss, Paternalism Versus Pugnacity: The Right to Counsel in
Japan and the United States, 72 IND. L.J. 291, 319 (1996); see also Choi DeSombre,
supranote 80, at 103.
85.
Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalismof Japanese Criminal Justice,
80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 341 (1992) [hereinafter Foote, Paternalism] (noting that the
Japanese system seeks to adjudicate crime without resorting to imprisoning the
defendant or burdening him with the stigma of a conviction or even of an arrest
wherever possible).
86.
See PORT, supra note 71, at 32 (stating that Japanese governance tends to
impose norms for society, rather than mandating rules that apply in advance).
87.
See Kenneth L. Port, The Japanese International Law "Revolution"InternationalHuman Rights Law and Its Impact on Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 139,
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Code of Criminal Procedure, the government may elect to suspend
prosecution"8 and simply issue a warning to the accused.8 9
Japanese prosecutors may also recommend that criminal
sentences be suspended.9 0 Since criminal sentences are relatively
short,9 1 and because of Japanese prosecutorial discretion, 92 there is a
sound argument that the Japanese system is more benevolent and
better for society than systems that place more emphasis on punitive
measures. Statistics show that prosecutions are suspended in 39% of
cases. 93 The main reason for this forbearance is that the imposition
of formal charges in Japan carries a serious social stigma that
impacts a defendant's life well beyond the adjudication of the
underlying crime. 94 Viewed from this perspective, some observers
'9 5
note that the Japanese system is "uncommonly just.
The downside of the Japanese criminal justice system is the
almost unbridled power of the procuracy and the judicial deference
courts afford it. Japanese prosecutors rarely go to court without a
confession in hand, 96 and Japanese judges routinely rubber-stamp
prosecutors' recommendations. 97 Some observers argue that Japanese
criminal trials are actually decided by prosecutors and police and that
the trials are mere formalities. 9 8 Because defense lawyers' roles are
greatly circumscribed, 99 and because of the way Japanese criminal
justice procedures are carried out, it is very possible that

163 (1991); see also A. Didrick Castberg, ProsecutorialIndependence in Japan, 16
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 39 (1997) (noting that the Japanese system is geared
towards restitution, whereas the U.S. system is geared towards punishment).
88.
KEISHOHO, art. 248 ("In case it is unnecessary to prosecute according to the
character, age and environment of an offender, the weight and conditions of an offense
as well as the circumstances after the offense, the public prosecution may not be
instituted.").
89.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 346-56 (detailing the Japanese focus
on specific prevention of crime through the suspension of sentences and prosecutions).
90.
Id. at 352-54.
91.
Id. at 354.
92.
Seuss, supra note 84, at 303-04 (noting that Japanese prosecutors exercise
more discretion and control over cases than U.S. prosecutors do, and even more than
the law explicitly allows).
93.
Ministry of Justice of Japan, Public Prosecutors Office, http://www.moj.go.jp/
ENGLISH/PPO/ppo-01.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Public Prosecutor's
Office].
94.
See Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 344 (noting that arrest records
have considerable effect on employment prospects and defendants' reputations).
95.
DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 280 (2002) (noting many problems with Japanese criminal justice but
concluding that. in the larger picture, the system works comparatively well with regard
to the needs and circumstances of individuals).
96.
Hiroshi Matsubara, Trial by Prosecutor,LEGAL AFF., Apr. 2003, at 11.
97.
See Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 143, 150; see also Susan Maslen, Japan and
the Rule of Law, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 281, 290 (1998).
98.
Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 143; see also Maslen, supra note 97, at 290.
99.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 338.
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constitutional rights can be violated by police or prosecutors.
Currently, the Japanese system does not protect an accused
individual from the government's search for truth, regardless of what
the constitution says.
C. Rights of the Accused and the Constitution
The Japanese constitution embraces the concepts of human
dignity and human rights in its preamble,1 00 and in Chapter III,
which sets forth certain "Rights and Duties of the People." 101 Many
of these provisions protect the rights of criminal suspects. However,
Japanese law enforcement practices demonstrate that Japanese
authorities do not respect the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants.
1.

Beatings Will Continue Until Morale Improves:
Confessions in Japan

Obtaining

The true centerpiece of Japanese criminal justice is the
confession, which is considered to be the first step in rehabilitating
l0 2
the criminal and the beginning of the reintegration process.
Confessions have been central to Japanese law enforcement practices
for hundreds of years, and torture was traditionally seen as an
acceptable method of obtaining a full confession.' 0 3 In the modern
era, Article 36 of Japan's constitution specifically prohibits the use of
torture by any public officer.' 0 4 Similarly, Article 38 prohibits selfincrimination and compelled confessions.1 0 5 Yet critics argue that the

100.

We desire to occupy an honored place .. .striving for the preservation
of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and
intolerance .... We recognize that all peoples of the world have the
right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

KENPO, pmbl.; see also DOWER, supra note 65, at 370 (noting that the preamble bears
resemblance to, inter alia, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg
Address, and the U.S. Constitution).
101.
KENP6, arts. 10-40.
102.
Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 330, 337 (stating that unless
confessions are obtained, reintegration of criminal offenders back into society cannot be
achieved, because confession is seen as the first step in accepting responsibility for the
offense).
103.
Id. at 328 (noting that torture was an accepted and codified method of
obtaining confessions during the Tokugawa era, and that confessions were regarded as
the best evidence of the truth).
104.
KENPO, art. 36 ("The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel
punishments are absolutely forbidden.").
105.

(1) No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. (2)
Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after
prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence. (3) No
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system is abusive and that it contradicts the constitution as well as
any concept of human rights.' 0 6 Alternatively, Japanese prosecutors
and police argue that without current methods of obtaining
10 7
confessions, they would not be able to effectively battle crime.
Some estimates put the rate of forced confessions as high as fifty
percent.' 0 8 Recent statements by Japanese police officials indicate
that forced confessions may be the norm rather than the exception
when a criminal defendant asserts his innocence but where the
authorities believe he is guilty.109
Examples of documented methods of extracting confessions
include slapping; punching, kicking, and generally beating suspects;
sleep deprivation; promises of timely release; threatening more
stringent punishments; 110 isolation or lack of privacy; 11' questioning
from early morning until late at night; binding fingers; making
suspects stand in certain positions; shouting in suspects' ears; and
offering suspects chances to see loved ones in return for a
confession. 112 Up to ninety percent of criminal suspects in Japan
confess to committing crimes. 113
In one case, a suspect even
114
confessed in order to prove his innocence upon release.

person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof
against him is his own confession.
Id. art. 38.
106.
See, e.g., Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 7-8 (noting
police willingness to "overbear the will of criminal suspects" and United Nation's
criticisms of Japan for "violating international protocols").
107.
See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 382 (noting that police and
prosecutors view defense counsel as obstructing prosecutions and overstepping their
bounds); see also Castberg, supra note 87, at 47 (noting that prosecutors argue that
allowing a detainee unlimited access to defense counsel risks destruction of evidence
and leaks to the press).
108.
Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 200 (citing estimates provided by Professor
Toshikuni Murai).
109.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 7 (quoting an
executive officer of the National Police Agency at a JSRC meeting as stating that "no
real statements will be made by the suspect unless he feels compelled to do so," and
that the "aim of interrogation is to bring this about by any means possible"); see also
ABOLISH DAYO-KANGOKU, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that suspects are treated worse if
they refuse to confess).
110.
JOHNSON, supra note 95, at 254-62. The author goes on to indicate that
during his one and one half years of research fieldwork in the Kobe District Public
Prosecutor's Office, three egregious cases of brutality came to his attention, all
illustrating the zeal with which prosecutors and police in Japan approach the process
of extracting confessions from criminal suspects. Id. Given that these incidents
occurred in an office hosting an official observer, this Author takes interest in the
question of how widespread such practices are in the Japanese system overall. See id.
111.
See Melissa Clack, Caught Between Hope and Despair: An Analysis of the
Japanese Criminal Justice System, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525, 533 (2003).
112.
ABOLISH DAIYO-KANGOKU, supranote 8, at 8.
113.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 337.
114.
See Port, supranote 87, at 163.
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Because the Japanese system relies so heavily on obtaining
confessions, there is great pressure to generate one as the prosecution
prepares for trial, and this pressure can lead to overzealous
measures.1 1 5 Without a confession, and where the case against a
16
suspect is questionable, prosecutors usually do not indict.'
Moreover, because Article 38(3) of the Japanese constitution does not
permit a defendant to be convicted solely on the basis of a
confession," 7 authorities continue to question suspects even after
obtaining confessions in order to elicit corroborating evidence." 8 The
coercive tactics routinely employed in extracting confessions are
clearly prohibited by Article 38(2) of the Japanese constitution, but
this does not stop Japanese authorities from violating the
fundamental rights of criminal defendants.
Some scholars have suggested that confessions in Japan are the
functional analogue of plea bargains in the United States, wherein
defendants bargain with the government and receive correspondingly
lighter sentences. 119 Under this view, the Japanese approach seems
to balance its lack of procedural protections during interrogation with
leniency after confession. 120 This encourages Japanese defendants to
confess. However, this arrangement grants prosecutorial leniency
only to those who are actually guilty or who are willing to confess,
and it does nothing for the wrongly accused. Japanese interrogations
have resulted in some well-publicized wrongful convictions. 121 The
system should protect the constitutional rights of innocent defendants
at least as much as it provides support for the guilty. Unfortunately,
Japan's new criminal justice reforms do not embrace the concept of
defendants' rights, and they fail to uphold constitutional prohibitions
against self-incrimination, compelled confession, and torture by
public officials.
2.

Japan Has a Right to Counsel, but What Happens in Detention
Stays in Detention

At first glance, Japan appears to have strong constitutional
protections against overbearing interrogations. However, the Code of

115.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 7 ("[T]he system's
extreme reliance on confessions leads to extreme efforts to obtain them.").
116.
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 7, at 61-62.
117.
KENP), art. 38(3) ("No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where
the only proof against him is his own confession.").
See Hirano, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that in Japan, confessions must be
118.
corroborated so they will hold up at trial); see also Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 200
(noting that confessions are also used as corrobative evidence).
119.
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 7, at 57.
120.
Seuss, supra note 84, at 321.
121.
See, e.g., Foote, Death Row, supra note 11; see also Maslen, supra note 97,
at 289.
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Criminal Procedure limits the effect of these constitutional
provisions, 122 rendering many of them meaningless. Article 34 of the
constitution provides for a right to counsel.' 23 Article 37(3) requires
the government to provide counsel for those who cannot obtain
representation.1 2 4 Taken together, these provisions require that
criminal defendants have access to an attorney in order to protect
25
their rights. Yet these protections do not apply to every defendant.'
For indigent defendants, the right to counsel does not attach until
after indictment, 126 and indictments are usually not issued until after
a confession has been obtained. 127 Even for those who can afford to
retain counsel, the Japanese system does not allow attorneys to be
28
present at interrogations.1
Japanese suspects (higisha) are thus at the mercy of police and
prosecutors until they are formally charged. 129 Upon indictment,
they become classified as defendants (hikokunin), and are then
afforded access to counsel.' 30 However, even this level of access is
limited, because under Article 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
prosecutors can control the scheduling and duration of defense
consultations whenever police determine that such meetings would
"interfere with an ongoing investigation."'13 1 Thus, under the Code of

122.
Kuk Cho, The Japanese "Prosecutorial Justice" and
Exclusionary Rule, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 39, 74 (1998).
123.

its

Limited

No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed
of charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel;
nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of
any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his
presence and the presence of his counsel.

KENPO, art. 34.
124.
Id. art. 37(3) ("At all times the accused shall have the assistance of
competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own
efforts, be assigned to use by the State.").
125.
Cho, supra note 122, at 58.
126.
Id.; see also Seuss, supra note 84, at 304 (noting that court-appointed
counsel are available only after indictment).
127.
See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 336, 374 (noting that the preindictment period is used for "questioning the suspect, demanding a confession, and
pursuing other crimes," and that indictment occurs only after the investigation is
largely completed).
128.
Id. at 338.
129.
Cho, supra note 122, at 58; see also KAWADA SHOBO SHINSA, JOSHIKI
TOSHITE SHITTE OKITAI SAIBAN NO SEKAI [MAKING SENSE OF TRIALS] 44-45 (2007).
130.
Cho, supra note 122, at 58.
131.
KEISHOH6, art. 39(3).
A public procurator, a secretary of the public procurator's office, or policemen
(referring to police inspectors or policeman; hereinafter the same), may, in case
it is necessary for the investigation, designate the date, place, and time
concerning interview or receipt [of documents] ...only prior to the institution
of public prosecution: provided, that such designation shall not unreasonably
restrict the rights of the suspect to prepare for defense.
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Criminal Procedure, defendants' access to counsel may be limited by
the arbitrary determinations of law enforcement officials.
Moreover, Japanese police regularly detain suspects in a police
cell instead of in a regular detention center. 132 This practice, known
as daiyo-kangoku, increases police access to criminal suspects for
questioning purposes, and decreases suspects' access to defense
attorneys. 133 Daiyo-kangoku was originally established in 1908 to
ease the shortage of proper detention centers, 134 but it still exists
today as a convenience to the police. 135 The use of police jail cells to
interrogate suspects helps to insulate suspects from the outside world
and leaves them particularly vulnerable to coercive pressure.
Consultations with defense attorneys are only allowed once every four
136
or five days, and generally last for about fifteen minutes at a time.
Those familiar with the U.S. system may be shocked by the
relatively long periods of pretrial detention without counsel in Japan.
Before indictment, a suspect can be held for a total of twenty-three
days, formulated as follows: the police can hold the suspect for fortyeight hours before deciding whether to release the suspect or transfer
him to prosecutors; the prosecutors then have twenty-four hours to
decide whether or not to request a ten-day extended detention period;
and if a judge grants the extension, the prosecutors may also request
a subsequent ten-day detention period. 137 Statistics indicate that
38
these requests are granted by the courts over 99.7% of the time.
Judges issue detention warrants "when there are reasonable grounds
to [believe] that the suspect has committed a crime,"'1 39 and where the
facts include any of the following circumstances: (1) the suspect has
no fixed dwelling; (2) there is sufficient cause to suspect that the
suspect will destroy evidence; and (3) there is sufficient cause to
suspect that the suspect will attempt to escape. 140 In Japan, this
extensive pretrial detention gives the government substantial time to

Id.; Seuss, supra note 84, at 305.
132.
See ABOLISH DAIYO-KANGOKU, supra note 8, at 4 (stating that detention
facilities are at a centralized location and daiyo kangoku (substitute prisons) are
basically holding cells in local police stations). Japan has a nationwide system of koban
(or neighborhood police boxes manned by several local officers). There are koban at
virtually every large intersection in urban Japan.
133.
Ishimatsu, supranote 6, at 148.
134.
ABOLISH DAIYo-KANGOKU, supra note 8, at 4.
135.
Id.
136.
See Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 338 ("According to various
estimates, meetings with counsel may be limited to fifteen minutes once every four or
five days in complex or difficult cases, and a suspect in detention is unlikely to have
much more opportunity to meet with counsel until the prosecutors have finalized their
case.").
137.
KEISHOHO, arts. 203-208-2; see also Castberg, supra note 87, at 46.
138.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 336.
139.
Outline, supra note 51.
140.
KEISHOH6, art. 60(1).

2008]

TESTINGJAPAN'S CONVICTIONS

interrogate suspects and to develop evidence against them, all
without benefit of counsel.
Perhaps a defense attorney's presence would encourage suspects
to assert their innocence more vigorously. Certainly, it would create
an independent record of the conditions of interrogation. Under the
current system, investigators prepare summaries of suspects'
confessions-often long afterward-and this becomes part of the
dossier on which Japanese courts rely so heavily. 14 1 Since Japanese
courts rarely question the documents the prosecution provides, and
14 2
because investigative dossiers are routinely accepted into evidence,
143
some experts refer to the system as "justice or trial by dossier."'
Incredibly, in the process of compiling trial dossiers, investigators
often discard evidence that is inconsistent with their theory of the
case or that they deem to be unreliable. 144 Moreover, there is no
Brady rule requiring the prosecution to divulge exculpatory evidence
to the defense. 145 In fact, under the Japanese system, the prosecution
only needs to disclose evidence it plans to use at trial. 146 The defense
may request evidence from prosecutors, but in Japan an adverse
1 47
party must know what a piece of evidence is before requesting it.
Therefore, if the prosecution has discarded exculpatory evidence in
assembling its dossier, the defense has no chance of obtaining it
through the discovery process, even if it knows what to look for. As a
result, the Japanese system relies more heavily on the accuracy of
police and prosecutors' memories, as well as on the veracity of their

141.
Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 337; see also Joachim Herrmann,
Models for Reform of the Criminal Trial in Eastern Europe:A ComparativePerspective,
1996 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 127, 138-39 (noting particular problems
with the presentation of investigative dossiers to judges in inquisitorial systems,
including: replacing live testimony with written transcripts, and the possibility that
judges may be influenced in their approach to the trial by the information in the
dossier not only because of psychological reasons, but also because notations of any
prior convictions would be found in the dossier).
142.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 338-39.
143.
Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 146-47 (noting that justice or trial by dossier is
conducted by: law enforcement questioning of victims, witnesses, or others; conducting
inspections, searches and seizures etc.; developing hunches and opinions, undertaking
thorough and time-consuming questioning of suspects (who are almost always
physically restrained by arrest or detention) in the pursuit of confessions corresponding
to the hunches and opinions they have previously developed, then incorporating the
results in accordance with their hunches and opinion into a detailed dossier (choso),
which the prosecutors use to file an indictment with, and which if accepted into
evidence, as it usually is, forms the basis for the guilty verdict).
144.
Id. at 151 (noting that instead of preserving all the evidence for later
review by a judge, the evidence is sifted according to the hunches of the investigators).
145.
PORT, supra note 71, at 803 (noting that in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court held that the prosecution must divulge exculpatory
evidence upon request, and that such information, known as Brady material is
routinely requested and received in U.S. criminal cases).
146.
See Castberg, supranote 87, at 68.
147.
Id. at 69.
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assertions. In the more adversarial U.S. system, which features
procedural protections weighted in the defendant's favor, such faith
14 8
in the government is almost unheard of.
In Japan, law enforcement officials draft the confessions that
suspects sign, based on the officials' recollections of what transpired
during interrogation. 14 9 Until recently, recording of interrogations
was not permitted, save for the written notations of the law
enforcement officials. 15 0
Initiatives put forward by the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations with regard to the videotaping of
15 1
confessions have been stiffly resisted by the police and prosecutors.
Authorities argue that videotaping is counterproductive and that it is
an unnecessary intrusion into the investigative process. 152 Notably,
the JSRC reformers specifically rejected proposals to videotape
interrogations. 15 3 Instead, they suggested the written notations of
interrogation sessions provided by law enforcement authorities are
sufficient.154
While the government has not required procedural change,
public pressure has caused the National Police Agency to adopt

148.
See Daniel H. Foote, Reflections on Japan's Cooperative Adversary Process,
in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS,
supra note 29, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Foote, Reflections] (noting the dominant position
of the prosecution in the Japanese system as compared to the United States, and the
weaker position of the defense in Japan); see also Herrmann, supra note 141, at 140
(noting that prosecutors in adversarial systems are supposed to inform the defense
when they learn that a witness's statement is false or when they learn about a witness
with information that is favorable to the defendant, and that the position of the defense
is much more favorable in adversarial systems because of the structure of trials that
allow the defense to present their case).
149.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 337.
150.
See Maslen, supra note 97, at 289.
151.
Kamiya, supra note 61.
152.
Id. (noting the statement of a senior official at the Supreme Public
Prosecutor's Office, who argues that videotaping interrogations prevents law
enforcement from reaching the truth, and noting that the National Police Agency also
opposes the idea); Upper House Backs Bill to Tape Grillings: Police Slam Measure;
Ruling Bloc
Veto Likely,
JAPAN TIMES, June 4,
2008, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2008O6O4al.html [hereinafter Upper House]
(citing Justice Minister Kunio Hatoyama, stating that adoption of the bill would turn
Japan into a "paradise for criminals," and that "heart to heart exchanges between and
investigator and a suspect have helped to delve into the truth behind crimes," and that
"a complete recording would make it difficult to establish the facts," and citing the
Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission Shinya Izumi who states that his
agency cannot accept the bill, and that he questions it by asking "Can it unravel the
truth?").
153.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 169.
154.
Id. ("A system should be introduced that imposes the duty of making a
written record, for every occasion of questioning, regarding the process and he
circumstances of the questioning, in order to ensure the propriety of questioning
suspects.").
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oversight measures to guide the interrogation process. 155 New
guidelines for monitoring interrogations reflect the public's declining
trust in police questioning methods because of media reports about a
series of recent acquittals. 156 Under the plan, prefectural police
forces will establish monitoring bodies comprised of officers from
noninvestigative divisions of the police department, and these officers
will ensure that set hours for interrogations are kept by reporting on
the times a suspect enters and exits questioning.1 5 7 Suspects will
also be able to submit complaints about interrogation procedures to
the monitoring body, and members of the monitoring body could also
158
be assigned to interrogation sessions.
While this is a step toward greater transparency in the
interrogation process, 159 the proposed system does not go far enough,
because it leaves the police to monitor themselves. As a result, it
remains unclear whether this new plan will truly help to uphold the
rights of criminal defendants. While public opinion has caused the
police to modify their procedures, the new plan does not go far enough
to ensure objectivity in the process by which confessions are obtained;
in fact, some observers even see the new plan as an attempt to get
ahead of growing public pressure to videotape interrogations in their
entirety.' 60 In any case, the new police monitoring system will not
ensure that the constitutional rights of criminal defendants are
recognized or upheld during the interrogation process.
Another recently advanced proposal would leave it to the lay
161
judges to decide whether or not to allow a confession into evidence.
However, permitting lay judges to determine the admissibility of
evidence in a criminal trial is problematic because they may have to
address matters of law. Under the new lay judge system, this is a

155.
See Cops Plan Monitors, supra note 62 (noting that public officials stated
that new guidelines to monitor interrogation were drawn up because of the effect of
media reports of a series of acquittals involving forced confessions, and as a result,
public trust in police tactics has been damaged); see also Police to Film Reading of
Interrogation Logs: Lawyers Call for More Transparency and for Recording Entire
Process, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20080404a4.html [hereinafter Police to Film] (stating that the proposed system
has been officially adopted by the National Police Agency and will be implemented
beginning in the summer of 2008). Organized crime cases will be excluded because of
fears of retaliation. Id.
156.
Cops Plan Monitors, supra note 62.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
See, e.g., Kamiya, supra note 61 (noting that partial recording is
insufficient).
161.

Lay Judges May Have Power Over Confessions, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 13,

2007, at 2, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007lll3a5.html
(noting that the Supreme Court's Legal Research and Training Institution (LRTI) is set
to propose letting lay judges determine whether or not to accept confession as evidence
at trial under the new lay judge system).
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function reserved for professional judges. 162 Tapping lay judges to
determine matters that require legal expertise is a misguided
proposal that should be avoided.
Pretrial detention can be extended beyond the twenty-three-day
163
limit if Japanese police feel they need more time to investigate.
Japanese police may release a detainee and re-arrest him on another
6 4 Authorities may arrest
charge-a practice known as bekken taiho.1
a suspect and subject him to detention for that offense, while
developing evidence about a more serious crime. 165 This pattern of
arrests for different offenses allows investigators to keep a suspect in
custody and under interrogation well beyond the twenty-three-day
limit. 166 In one case, a suspect was arrested for fourteen different
crimes, and his detention lasted almost three years. 167 Court
challenges to the application of bekken taiho have not been
successful. 168 Japanese courts consider the practice to be valid unless
it can be proven that it was purposely applied with the intention of
extracting evidence about the more serious crime.1 6 9 Unfortunately,
current criminal justice reform discussions do not contemplate this
problem.
Despite the fact that practices such as daiyo kangoku and bekken
taiho abridge defendants' constitutional rights, the JSRC Report
specifically rejected proposals that the substitute prison system
should be abolished and did not even mention the practice of
consecutive arrests. 170 While the report recognized that there are
problems with defendants' rights to counsel, it limited its concrete
recommendations to the appropriation of a system of public
defenders. 171 Current reforms under the Lay Assessor's Act do not
ensure a full recognition of the constitutional right to counsel.

162.
See Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 240-41 (stating that under Article
6 (2) of the Lay Assessor's Act, professional judges are to make decisions regarding the
interpretation of laws and procedure).
163.
Castberg, supra note 87, at 46.
164.
Id. (detailing the bekken taiho process).
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Cho, supra note 122, at 55 (citing Murakami v. Japan, 17 KEISHO 1795
(Sup. Ct., Oct. 17, 1963)).
168.
Id. at 56 (citing Hirasawa v. Japan, 9 KEISHO 663 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 6, 1955),
Ishikawa v. Japan, 31 KEISHU 821 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 9, 1977)). Cho notes that in both
cases the court's decision was based on whether law enforcement detained the suspects
on the lesser charges to intentionally extract information about the main charge for
which they sought evidence, and that in both cases, despite consecutive detentions, the
Supreme Court held that they did not. Id.
169.
Id.
170.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 168 (noting that changes to the
system with regard to the custody of suspects and defendants are "difficult matters"
because of "various ways of thinking arising from differences in assessments about the
current state of affairs").
171.
Id. at 165.
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Japan Has a Right to Silence, but Defendants Are Questioned
Anyway

In Japan, the constitutional right to silence is not upheld in any
meaningful way. In the United States, the Miranda rule requires all
police questioning to stop when a suspect invokes the right to remain
silent or requests an attorney. 172 Japan has no such rule, but it does
have a constitutional provision that lays the foundation for the
Japanese right to silence. 173 Under Article 38(1) of the constitution,
all persons are protected from being compelled to testify against
themselves. 174 This right should apply to all people regardless of
whether they are classified as suspects, under arrest, or in detention.
However, Article 198 of Japan's Code of Criminal Procedure limits
the scope of this right by allowing police to request that suspects
accompany them to the station for questioning. 175 In addition to
Article 38(1) of the constitution, Article 198 is supposed to help
protect suspects in such voluntary detention by requiring police to
inform them that they are not required to make statements
176
unwillingly.
Because these provisions apply only to suspects-not to those
formally detained or under arrest-Article 198 has been interpreted
as providing for a duty by those arrested or in detention to submit to
questioning. 177 In theory, suspects do not have to answer questions,
but the Japanese right to silence does not free a detainee or arrestee
from the rigorous questioning process. 178 Even where a defendant
1 79
asserts his right to silence, he must still undergo interrogation.
While investigators must warn suspects that they have a right to
silence before questioning begins, 8 0 this is not repeated at every

172.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
173.
KENPO, art. 38(1) ("No person shall be compelled to testify against
himself.").
174.
Id.
175.

A public procurator, a secretary of the public procurator's office, or a
policeman may, when it is necessary for conducting an investigation of
an offense, call upon the suspect to appear and examine him; provided,
that the suspect may, except in such cases as arrested or detained,
refuse to appear, or leave at any time after appearance.

KEISHOHO, art. 198(1).
176.
Id. art. 198( 2) ("[Tlhe suspect shall beforehand be notified that he shall not
required to make statement contrary to his will.").
177.
See Choi DeSombre, supra note 80, at 110 (describing the process known as
torishirabejunin gimu, which is interpreted by negative implication to mean that
suspects who are arrested or in detention cannot refuse questioning).
178.
Id.
179.
Id.; Cho, supra note 122, at 57.
180.
KEISHOHO, art. 198(2); see also Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 336.
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interrogation session.' 8 ' Because of the coercive nature of Japanese
interrogations, the failure to reiterate the right to silence warning at
each installment of the interrogation process dilutes its initial
effect.' 8 2 This eviscerates the constitutional right to silence. Forcing
a person to endure discomforts and abuses until he gives up his right
to silence is more likely to distill an accurate picture of his capacity
for silence under duress than it is to elicit credible information about
crime. But because confession is ingrained as a central concept in the
Japanese criminal justice process, the constitutional right to silence
is routinely ignored.' 8 3 Unfortunately, current reform initiatives do
nothing to uphold the constitutional right to silence.
4.

Would You Mind Coming with Us?

Because
Japanese
police
can
request
"voluntary
accompaniment," they can often avoid the requirement of obtaining
an arrest warrant. 8 4 Under Article 33 of the constitution, police
need a warrant to make an arrest, except for cases where suspects
are caught in the criminal act or where suspects are "flagrant"
offenders.' 8 5 However, because the Code of Criminal Procedure
allows police to request "voluntary" accompaniment,1 8 6 the police are
able to skirt the warrant requirement on a technicality, as there is no
formal detention or arrest if a person voluntarily accompanies police.
The constitution does not attach to protect a suspect who is not
formally detained.' 8 7 There are similar provisions in the Police Duty

181.
Cho, supra note 122, at 57.
182.
Choi DeSombre, supra note 80, at 111 ("[T]he right to silence is likely to be
undermined by daily questioning over many days.").
183.
See Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 149-50 (noting the routine practices of
Japanese criminal judges; in contested proceedings where both sides stick to opposing
positions, and where defendants claimed coercive interrogation at the hands of
investigators, the great majority of judges assumed that the questioning was voluntary
without actually deciding whether the defense or the prosecution was telling the truth,
and, as a result, the record of such confessions is regularly admitted into evidence).
184.
KENP6, art. 33 ("No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant
issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person
is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense being committed.").
185.
KEISHOHO, art. 212 (defining flagrant offenders are those being pursued
"with hue and cry"; those carrying stolen goods, arms or other objects that appear to
have been used in a crime; those whose clothing or body evinces conspicuous traces of
the offense; and those who flee when challenged by the police).
186.
Id. art. 197(1) (providing that police may conduct necessary examination in
order to obtain the objectives of the investigation, provided that compulsory measures
may not be taken unless stipulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure); id. art. 198(1)
(providing that when it is necessary for conducting an investigation of an offense, the
police may request the suspect to appear and be examined); Cho, supra note 122, at 51.
187.
Cho, supra note 122, at 51 (noting that voluntary accompaniment is not
formal detention, so constitutional restrictions do not attach, and even though a
suspect is technically free to leave, he may not in practice be able to avoid questioning).
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Act. 8 8 Supposedly one can refuse the questioning, but critics point
out that when faced with a request to accompany the police, most
Japanese feel duty-bound to comply.18 9 Japanese courts interpret
voluntary accompaniment loosely, and this affords police the
flexibility they need to convince suspects to consent to "voluntary"
190
questioning.
Voluntary accompaniment is common in Japan, and it fits into
the model of Japan as a paternalistic and benevolent criminal justice
system because it helps to avoid mistaken arrests. 191 However, it can
lead to extended interrogations. 19 2 Japanese courts have upheld the
practice of voluntary accompaniment, 193 and they have authorized the
police to apply force to keep a suspect under questioning. 9 4 In
Ikuhara v. Japan, a murder suspect voluntarily accompanied the
police and he was interrogated for four days and nights. 195 During
his voluntary interrogation he was lodged near the police station at
public expense along with several police officers who closely
monitored him. 196 The suspect confessed, and in dismissing his

188.
Id. (stating that under the Police Duty Act the police may stop an
individual to question him, and request a detained individual to go to a police station
for "voluntary" questioning).
189.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 56 (noting that Japanese people have a high
respect for authority figures, a characteristic that finds its roots in Confucianism).
190.
Cho, supra note 122, at 51 (noting that long periods of interrogation have
not been invalidated, as has the use of physical force during interrogation).
191.
See Satoru Morizane, Initial Encounters Between Police and Citizens: A
Comparative Study of the United States and Japan, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 561, 593
n.155 (1999) (arguing that the idea behind the practice is to avoid a mistaken arrest
and humiliating a suspect in front of his family or in public).
192.
See JOHNSON, supra note 95, at 257-59 (cataloging the brutality directed at
an elderly witness to a corruption investigation in Sendai in 1993). The witness, who
was interviewed on a voluntary basis endured one day of mistreatment at the hands of
a public prosecutor, and was ordered to return the following day for more mental and
physical abuse which prompted him to sign a statement prepared by the prosecutor. Id.
193.
Cho, supra note 122, at 51 (noting cases involving numerous half-day
interrogations, and all night non-stop interrogation).
194.
Id. (noting Tanahashi v. Japan, 30 KEISHU 187 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 16, 1976)).
But see Morizane, supra note 191, at 590 (construing and discussing Tanahashi, 30
KEISHU 187). Tanahashi was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and
had voluntarily accompanied police to the station where he refused a breath analysis
test. Id. Tanahashi ran toward the door but was stopped when an officer grabbed his
wrist, spurring Tanahashi to strike the officer in the face. Id. Since Tanahashi was
under the influence, but had apparently voluntarily accompanied the police, it appears
that the distinction between voluntary accompaniment and actual arrest is somewhat
unclear. Had the police simply arrested Tanahashi the issue would have been moot, as
he voluntarily accompanied the police; however, it seems he should have had the right
to leave the police station, at least until after he struck the officer.
195.
Morizane, supra note 191, at 594.
196.
Id. Morizane, a police superintendent in Gunma Prefecture, points out that
Ikuhara had requested to be lodged by the police. Id. Morizane questions why the
suspect would not have simply requested to be allowed to be set free if he were not
being officially detained. Id. at 595-96.
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appeal, the Japanese court noted that there was no proof on record
that the suspect had refused interrogation and lodging, and it upheld
the interrogation because any potential transgression of the law by
the police was consistent with "socially accepted views. '197 The
interrogation was ultimately held to have been voluntary in
98
nature. 1
It is perhaps not surprising that the court could find no proof
that the suspect had refused interrogation because without a defense
attorney present, the only record of what transpired during
interrogation would have been supplied by the police. In reaching
their ultimate decision, the court noted that the suspect was
effectively under arrest at the time he was interrogated. 19 9 Instead of
getting a warrant to legitimize the suspect's detention and
questioning, the police didn't need one because the suspect
"consented" to the questioning through voluntary accompaniment. 200
Japanese courts seem to have difficulty distinguishing between arrest
and voluntary accompaniment in this type of case, and they have
interpreted the meaning of police compulsion very narrowly. 201 As a
result, voluntary accompaniment is a useful tool that can help the
police circumvent the warrant requirement and other protections that
should attach for a defendant who is under formal arrest. Voluntary
accompaniment also insulates police activities from constitutional
and public scrutiny.20 2 Current reforms do not address the system of
voluntary accompaniment and therefore do not uphold the
constitutional warrant requirement.
5.

Double Jeopardy: If at First You Don't Convict, Try, Try Again!

Japan has adopted the principle of double jeopardy into its legal
system, but it applies the concept differently than the United States
does. In the U.S., the double jeopardy principle protects those
acquitted of crimes from being retried for the same offense. 20 3 Japan

197. Id.
198.
Id. at 596.
199.
See id. at 595 ("The Court expressed doubt as to whether the defendant
could act at will, because it appeared that the defendant was in a situation where he
had no choice but to the prolonged interrogation.").
Id. at 594-96.
200.
Id. at 597-98 (noting that the Japanese Supreme Court's view of
201.
voluntariness may include some compulsive factors, and that the Court will balance
the compulsive factors with the degree of infringement the suspect suffers).
202.
See Seuss, supra note 84, at 303 (noting that the constitutional right to
counsel is triggered upon arrest and therefore does not apply to suspects who
voluntarily accompany police).
203.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offense
").
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
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accepted this principle into its postwar constitution, 20 4 but applies it
more narrowly. 20 5 In Japan, the right does not attach until there
20 6
have been three levels of review.
One level of full review of both facts and law is available on
motion by either the defendant or the prosecutor. 20 7 This review is
called a koso appeal. 208 Koso appeals mainly involve oral arguments
presented at trial. 20 9 Appellate courts may either sustain the
judgment of the lower court or quash the original judgment and
remand the case. 210 The court may also issue its own judgment based
on the record and the proceedings. 21 1 Where the appeal is filed by the
defendant only, a sentence heavier than that imposed by the court of
first instance may not be issued. 2 12
In effect, the rule gives
prosecutors greater incentive to file appeals in cases where they feel
that the sentence imposed in the original court was inadequate.
There are at least two more levels of review available. Against
the judgment of a koso appeal, a defendant may appeal to Japan's
Supreme Court for final adjudication. 2 13 This second appeal (known
as jokoku) is limited to allegations of a violation of the constitution,
214
an error in its interpretation, or an alleged conflict with precedent.
However, the Supreme Court may elect to review either the facts of
the case or the law. 215 In cases where the Supreme Court quashes
the original judgment, it may remand the case back to the court of
first instance, 216 or it may enter its own judgment based on the court
records and the evidence.2 17 In addition, after the entire appeals
process is complete, a convict or his heirs may petition for a new
218
trial.

204.
KENPO, art. 39 ("No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which
was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall
he be placed in double jeopardy.").
205.
Ramlogan, supranote 63, at 209.
206.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 340-41.
207.
Id. at 340.
208.
Outline, supranote 51.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
See KENPO, art. 81. Under this Article, the Supreme Court has the
authority to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.
Id.
214.
Outline, supra note 51.
215.
Foote, Paternalism,supranote 85, at 340.
216.
Outline, supranote 51.
217.
Id.
218.
KEISHOHO, arts. 435, 439; see also Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at
340.
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2 19
The fact that Japanese prosecutors can appeal acquittals
combined with harsh detention and interrogations, and the
acceptance of prosecutors' evidence dossiers at trial may contribute
strongly to Japan's 99% conviction rate. On the surface, numerous
levels of review appear to guarantee that justice is ultimately served.
However, the appeals process takes time, and time is an especially
22 0
precious and nonrenewable resource for the wrongly convicted.
Moreover, allowing prosecutors to second-guess the decisions of lay
judges under the new system threatens to undermine the validity and
goals of the entire process, because it mitigates the value of lay
participation in the justice system. Yet the JSRC Report did not
recommend eliminating koso appeals, 221 and the Lay Assessor's Act
does not address the issue. Current reform initiatives do not uphold
the constitutional right to double jeopardy protection.

6.

The Presumption of Innocence

The Japanese criminal justice system does not support the
presumption of innocence. The idea of a presumption of innocence is
a necessary feature of justice in a democratic society. 222 It requires
the government to meet its burden of proof through the use of fair
and lawful procedures to ensure that the rights of the accused are not
unduly violated. However, under the Japanese criminal justice
system, the only people who are detained are those who are already
considered to be guilty. 22 3 After arrest, police focus on obtaining
confessions about facts they believe to be true, based mainly on the
hunches developed during their investigations.2 24 It seems unlikely
that police and prosecutors would interrogate with such documented
intensity if they doubted a suspect's guilt. 225 Moreover, because
Japanese society generally views criminal suspects as guilty of the

219.
See Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 209 (citing a judgment of the Japanese
Supreme Court for the proposition that double jeopardy as incorporated in Japanese
law is interpreted narrowly and more restrictively in Japan than in the AngloAmerican tradition).
220.
Id. at 207 (noting that four wrongfully convicted individuals spent decades
on death row before their cases were heard and that they were released on appeal).
221.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 216.
222.
See Dina M. Bernardelli, Russian Rule-ette: Using Khodorkovsky's Criminal
Trial to Assess the State of Russia's Judiciary, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 85, 94
(2008) ("The right to a fair trial includes ... the presumption of innocence.").
223.
See Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 205 ("The traditions of Japan suggest that
only the guilty are arrested.").
224.
See id. at 200 (noting that Japanese investigators use confessions not only
to ascertain culpability but also to obtain corroborative evidence and other information
to build their investigative dossier); see also Cho, supra note 122, at 44-45 (detailing
the importance of confession in the Japanese model); Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 147
(describing police investigations that are driven by police hunches and opinions).
225.
See JOHNSON, supra note 95, at 254-62.
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crimes they are charged with, 226 even acquitted defendants cannot
escape from the stigma of criminality. 22 7 None of these symptoms is
conducive to a presumption of innocence.
The role of defense attorneys in the adjudication of criminal
matters also challenges the presumption of innocence. Japanese
defense attorneys seem less focused on zealous representation than
on mitigating their clients' culpability. 228 Japanese defense attorneys
mainly encourage clients to apologize so that prosecutors will be more
likely to suspend prosecution, and they work to minimize the
sentences imposed on their clients after their convictions. 229 This
contrasts sharply with the more adversarial U.S. model, which
requires zealous advocacy and features a combative relationship
between the prosecution and the defense. 230 For these reasons, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that Japanese defense attorneys have
been at least partly co-opted by the procuracy, and that they function
more like agents of the government than as advocates of clients'
rights. 231 Rather than upholding any presumed innocence, Japanese
defense attorneys almost seem to assume that their clients are
guilty.232 Perhaps this less adversarial defense role reflects a tacit
understanding that the presumption of innocence does not really exist
for those who are swept up in the Japanese criminal process.
Comparing the Japanese constitution with Japanese law
enforcement practices shows that constitutional rights in Japan do
not strictly track their Western interpretations. 233 Japanese criminal
justice is influenced more by thousands of years of cultural and

226.
Foote, Paternalism, supra note 85, at 344 (noting that once suspects are
arrested they are widely considered by the media and the public to be guilty as
charged).
227.
See id. (noting that the stigma of arrest is the most severe in the Japanese
criminal justice system and that arrested suspects are widely regarded by the public as
guilty).
228.
See Masayuki Murayama, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Japanese
Criminal Process, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES
AND COMPARISONS, supra note 29, at 42, 54-55 (noting that Japanese defense lawyers

act as "caretakers" in the criminal process by helping clients to tell the truth and
obtain more lenient treatment).
229.
See Seuss, supra note 84, at 319-20 ("Defense counsel in Japan may even
encourage his client to plead guilty, much as an American attorney would at pleabargaining stages, which in turn might lead to a reduced sentence or suspension of
prosecution.").
230.
Id. at 306; see also Herrmann, supra note 141, at 136 (noting the "sporting
theory" of justice and an often times aggressive advocacy in trial proceedings).
231.
See Seuss, supra note 84, at 306 (noting that Japanese defense counsel
sometimes resemble advocates for the state).
232.
See Murayama, supra note 228, at 54 (arguing that defense lawyers accept
the prosecution's legal construct of guilt by attempting to mitigate circumstances after
the accused has confessed).
233.
See Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 211 (noting that the use of Western
language in an Asian constitution does not necessarily guarantee that the concepts will
be applied the same way in a different culture).
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historical development and its code system of justice than by its
Current reform initiatives do not uphold
modern constitution.
Western interpretations of the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants.
D. Japan's Commitment to InternationalHuman Rights
The Japanese view of international human rights protection is
congruent with the Japanese understanding of the meaning of
individual rights. The argument that "Japan's constitution was
imposed by the Americans" seems unavailing in this context, because
ratifying international human rights instruments is a product of
voluntary state action.2 34 It would be difficult to argue that Western
powers forced Japan to ratify human rights instruments. Yet Japan's
treatment of criminal defendants violates provisions of international
human rights treaties that it has voluntarily joined.
Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) 235 in 1979, and it acceded to the Convention Against
Torture (CAT) 23 6 in 1999. These instruments set forth general rights
237
to be free from torture and other cruel and degrading treatment.
Article 98 of Japan's constitution provides that the constitution is the
238
supreme law of Japan and that treaties will be followed.
Treaties in Japan are generally self-executing and require no
enabling legislation to give rise to individual rights. 23 9 Certain

234.
Id. at 155.
235.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200 (XXI),
Annex, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Jun. 9, 2004), http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/
report.pdf [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS] (indicating that Japan ratified the
ICCPR on Sept. 21, 1979).
236.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
93rd plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter
CAT]; see also STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra note 235 (indicating that Japan
acceded to the CAT on July 29, 1999).
237.
See Vize, supra note 9, at 351.
238.

This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law,
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof,
contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. 2)
The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall
be faithfully observed.

KENPO, art. 98.

239.
Port, supra note 87, at 152. But see Ramlogan, supra note 63, at 154 (citing
Judgment of Dec. 19, 1984, Osaka Kosai [High Court], 1145 Hanji 3, 22 (Japan) (a
judgment of the Osaka High Court that the ICCPR is not self-executing)); id. at 153
(noting that Professor Lawrence Repeta has argued that the ICCPR is a self-executing
treaty).
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provisions of the ICCPR and the CAT apply to the treatment of the
criminally accused. For example, the ICCPR contains a provision
upholding the right to counsel and a ban on forced confessions under
Article 14(3).240 Various other provisions throughout the ICCPR
uphold the rights of the criminally accused. Under Article 7 of the
JCCPR, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. '241 Under Article 9, "[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. '242 Under Article
10, "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person."243 Under Article 14(2), "[e]veryone charged with a criminal
to be presumed innocent until proved
offence shall have the right
'2 4 4
law.
to
according
guilty
Because of Article 98 of Japan's constitution, these ICCPR
human rights provisions should provide criminal defendants in Japan
with the right to counsel; freedom from self-incrimination, forced
confession, torture, and other inhuman or degrading treatment and
punishment; and the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty. However, Japanese adherence to the scope of international
human rights protections for criminal defendants appears to extend
only as far as those rights are given meaning in the Japanese
245
domestic context-if even that far.
For example, while Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture, it
may not be clear exactly what practices constitute torture. Defining
torture is particularly difficult in a culture that has historically
viewed it as an acceptable method of obtaining confession. 246 Under
the CAT:
[T]he term torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the

240.

ICCPR, supra note 235, art. 14,

3(b).

In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: . . . (b) To have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his choosing; . . . (g) Not to be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt.

Id.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

ICCPR, supra note 235, art. 7.
Id. art. 9, 1.
Id. art. 10, 1.
Id. art. 14, 2.
See Port, supra note 87, at 165-66.
See Foote, Paternalism,supranote 85, at 328.
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instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
247
other person acting in an official capacity.

Perhaps Japanese authorities hold a different view of what
constitutes torture, 248 or don't respect international human rights
treaties. Even though Japan has acceded to the CAT, which prohibits
exceptions to justify the use of torture for any reason, 249 law
enforcement authorities continue to violate the rights of the
250
criminally accused, and the courts continue to accept such actions.
Japan willingly joined these human rights regimes, but it does not
apply their provisions domestically. 25 1 Japanese authorities give
international human rights protections for the criminally accused the
same narrow treatment that they give to similar provisions in the
constitution.

252

Since Japan cannot plausibly argue that the human rights
treaties that it has voluntarily joined were imposed by a Western
power, as some have argued regarding the constitution, 253 a question
emerges: How does Japan reconcile the ideals of the international

247.
CAT, supra note 236, art. 1,
1. It should be noted that while the last
sentence of paragraph 1 of the CAT stipulates that torture "does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions," the
extraction of a forced confession is not a sanction, but a method under which
information is gained in order to convict a suspect. Furthermore, Article 31 of the
Japanese Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor
shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established
by law." KENPO, art. 31. Japan's codified and legally established procedures do not
authorize torture. Vize, supra note 9, at 351-52.
248.
See, e.g., Cop: Humiliating Man Not a Crime, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071123a3.html (noting the case
of a senior police officer who admitted that he had humiliated a suspect into confessing
to a crime he did not commit, but that that the officer also denied that his actions
during the interrogation were a crime).
249.
CAT, supra note 236, art. 2,
2 ("No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever... may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
250.
See Port, supra note 87, at 165 (noting the tension between Japanese
criminal law norms and procedures and the country's international human rights
commitments, and that in criminal cases Japanese prosecutors and judges overlook or
misconstrue the provisions of international human rights treaties).
251.
See U.N. Committee Recommendations, supra note 10 (noting that the
Japan Federation of Bar Association's statement of support for the 2005 United
Nations Committee Against Torture report on Japan expressed deep concerns about
both the manner of detention and interrogation of Japanese criminal defendants and
the insufficiency of procedural mechanisms to preclude the abuse of their rights and
supported the principles of presumption of innocence, right to silence and right to
defense).
252.
See Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien
Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415,
469 (1999); see also Vize, supra note 9, at 357.
253.
Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of
Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 127, 159 (2005) (noting that some of those
currently in favor or revising the war-renunciation clause of the Japanese Constitution
argue that it was imposed by the Americans).
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human rights regimes to which it is a party with its domestic law
enforcement practices? This Article argues that it cannot, but that
the introduction of the lay judge system could be the first step in a
sequence of deeper reforms that would bring the Japanese criminal
justice in line with the Japanese constitution and with human rights
treaties. Regardless of diverging perspectives about the meaning of
rights, the issue that remains is the plight of innocent criminal
defendants who are forced to endure coercive interrogation
procedures. Current reform plans do not protect innocent defendants,
because they do not uphold Japan's constitution or its international
human rights commitments.
E. Japan'sApproach to CriminalJustice: Rationale or
Rationalization,and Does It Matter?
Perhaps Japanese law enforcement practices may only be truly
understood by placing them in the context of Asian legal and
philosophical traditions. Imposing Western ideals and concepts in a
nation with long-standing cultural and historical traditions may not
be the simple proposition that the U.S. occupation forces under
General MacArthur thought it would be. 254 Moreover, because
Japan's legal structures are based on a civil code understanding of
the meaning of rights, 255 wherein recognized rights require
procedural codification, 256 the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants only take legal form as they are applied under the
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure. 257 Given that the Japanese
Code of Criminal Procedure is rooted in traditions that operate to
restrict the system from embracing Western-style rights as set forth
in the constitution, 258 Japanese criminal justice appears to be at odds
with its legal foundations.
and
be
"benevolent
might
criminal
justice
Japan's
paternalistic,"259 but the theory underlying the system makes little
difference to an innocent person who is being tortured and coerced

254.
PYLE, supra note 1, at 219 (citing Douglas MacArthur's July 4, 1947 article
in Life magazine, in which the General opined "that the values and institutions that
came out of the U.S. experience 'are no longer peculiarly American, but now belong to
the entire human race,"' and noting that the occupation forces in Japan "did not
consider [Japan's history and culture] as an insurmountable barrier.., because they
believed that American values and institutions were of universal validity.").
255.
See Port, supra note 87, at 166 (noting that the word "right" did not exist in
Japan until the 1870s when the French Civil Code was translated into Japanese).
Stein, supra note 74, at 1598.
256.
Id. (noting that constitutions in civil code countries must be supplemented
257.
by codes, which operate as necessary corollaries).
258.
See Cho, supra note 122, at 61.
259.
See generally Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85.
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Publicized cases of forced confessions

underscore the dangers of relying on coercive interrogation
measures. 26 1 For many observers, the system of Japanese criminal
justice amounts to Japanese injustice,262 because current practices
deprive the criminally accused of the right to counsel, the right to
silence, the presumption of innocence, and double jeopardy
protections.
It seems plausible that a system of reform that is truly geared
towards achieving "better justice" would try to address the disconnect
between constitutional rights and the practices of Japanese police
and prosecutors. Providing remedies to these problems in the process
of criminal justice reform would increase confidence and trust in the
system, and it would deflect outside criticism. This would help to
legitimize the criminal justice process by resolving disputes in a way
that commands the respect of the citizenry. 263 However, advancing
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants has not been part of
the Japanese government's reform plan. In fact, the recognition of
defendants' rights does not even seem to be on the government's
264
radar screen.
Unless some imperative causes the government to give greater
consideration to the rights of criminal defendants, current reforms
will not advance those rights. However, as the new lay judge system
approaches, media pressure to uphold the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants is increasing because of news reports about the
265
substitute detention system and the conditions of interrogations.

260.
See Cho, supra note 122, at 61 (arguing that the benevolence of the
Japanese criminal justice system is reserved to those who do not contest charges
against them, and that the Code of Criminal Procedure stands in the way of
defendants' rights).
261.
Foote, Death Row, supra note 11, at 12; see also Ramlogan, supra note 63,
at 200 (noting that seven convictions were overturned in 1988 for coerced confessions,
eleven in 1990, and six between 1990 and May 1991).
262.
See, e.g., Clack, supra note 111, at 525 (noting that the world is beginning
to acknowledge that Japanese interrogation procedures violate human rights).
263.
See Peter Aranella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 188 (1983) (arguing
that by articulating fair process norms, the state can validate use of its coercive power
and command the respect of its citizens); see also Seuss, supra note 84, at 311 (arguing
that extending rights such as the right to counsel performs a legitimizing function by
commanding community respect for the fairness of the adjudication process and the
reliability of its outcomes).
264.
See Jones, supra note 28, at 365-66 (noting Professor Maruta's opinion that
the lay judge system is designed to minimize any real impact that the citizen
participants might have on the outcome of trials, and that the real goal is to give the
appearance of legitimacy by having citizens ratify judicially controlled decisions).
265.
See Kamiya, supra note 61 (detailing the case of a forty-year-old man
wrongly convicted of rape in Toyama Prefecture in 2002 who languished in prison for
over two years before his conviction was overturned, and citing a 2004 case from
Kagoshima Prefecture in which twelve people were wrongly convicted of violating the
Public Offices Election Law, and stating that with the lay judge system set to debut in
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As human interest stories about wrongful convictions 266 and various
police scandals 267 raise public awareness, trust in the police is
declining. 268
Public opinion has begun to influence police
interrogation policies, 269 and it has had a limited impact on the way
2 70
that capital punishments are carried out by the Ministry of Justice.
Public pressure for greater transparency in the criminal justice
system could also affect the implementation of the new lay judge
system. 27 1 One way for the new system to meet its goals of restoring

2009, analysts think that increasing civic participation in the judicial system may force
changes in the criminal justice system); see also Nagata, supra note 61. Nagata details
comments by former Shizuoka district court judge Norimichi Kumamoto, who doubts
the 1968 conviction of a former professional boxer of murder charges. Nagata, supra
note 61. Judge Kumamoto criticized police interrogation methods, which included
twenty straight days of twelve-hour-per-day interrogation sessions without the
presence of a lawyer. Id. Judge Kumamoto felt, during deliberations on the case, that
something was wrong with the confession and was critical of the fact that these
methods of interrogation have basically remained unchanged in the last forty years. Id.
266.
See Foote, Death Row, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing four wrongful
convictions that were the results of forced confessions at the hands of police who
engaged in overbearing interrogation practices, and noting that the cases instigated a
great deal of public and private soul-searching about the Japanese criminal justice
system).
267.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that the
Japanese police have had a major problem with corruption that has lasted decades, and
citing examples such as bribe taking and the use of slush funds).
268.
Lillian Roe Gilmer, Note, Japan's Communications Interception Act:
Unconstitutional Invasion of Privacy or Necessary Tool?, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
893, 919-20 (2002) (noting that a large percentage of the population distrust police
because of numerous scandals, cover-ups, leaks of investigative information, and a low
number of disciplinary actions imposed upon them); see also Johnson, Justice System
Reform, supra note 24, at 5-6 (noting that in a recent survey some 60% of Japanese
said their trust in police has declined, and 45% stated that they had no trust in police
at all).
269.
Cops Plan Monitors, supra note 62.
270.
Fumio Tanaka & Toshimitsu Miyai, Execution Details Reflect Disclosure
Tide; Transparency Trend, Changes to Judicial System Led to Hatoyama's Decision,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (TOKYO), Dec. 9, 2007 (noting that the Ministry of Justice
announced the names of three death row inmates for the first time because of a number
of factors that are changing the Japanese judicial system; one such factor was the
approaching lay judge system and the trend toward greater transparency); see also Jun
Hungo, Three Hanged and Named in Ministry First:Disclosures End Secrecy Policy on
Executions, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20071208al.html (attributing the government's disclosure of the names of those
executed as a response to public criticisms of the methods by which the Ministry of
Justice has traditionally carried out executions, with involved little notice to the
condemned and no notice to the next of kin).
271.
See Hamano, supra note 252, at 419 (noting the tenacity of pro-Japanese
Constitution individuals and groups that have litigated for the enforcement of
constitutional rights, and for the enforcement of international human rights treaties,
and that these efforts have had some positive effects in Japanese lower courts). But see
Jones, supra note 28, at 368 (noting Professor Maruta's opinion that only the
implementation of a U.S.-style jury system will uphold basic human rights and
guarantees under the Constitution because it would inspire consideration of the way
police conduct investigations and compel confessions).
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faith and trust in the judicial process would be to ensure that its
implementation includes a fuller recognition of defendants'
constitutional rights.
IV. THE IMPACT

OF JAPANESE JUSTICE REFORM ON

DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS

The lay judge system presents Japan with its best chance for
meaningful reform in facilitating the recognition of defendants'
constitutional rights. However, a government initiative supporting a
fuller recognition of those rights does not appear likely unless there is
substantial societal pressure for that to occur. 2 7 2 The Japanese
government recognizes that there are problems with the treatment of
criminal defendants, 2 73 but the limited advances set forth in the Lay
Assessor's Act do not even reach the recommendations in the JSRC
Report and will not significantly impact the treatment of the
criminally accused. At the same time, governments can evolve
incrementally, and to be fair, the JSRC Report does indicate that its
recommendations are only an initial step. 274 Unfortunately, the
Japanese government has not even taken this step.
If the lay judge system is successful in creating more
participation in government, then it could become the vehicle for
change that many hope it will be. However, advancing defendants'
rights will require more than the imposition of a mixed jury system.
The presence of lay judge panels will not by themselves engender
meaningful reform for criminal defendants' rights, unless criminal
procedures are modified to align with the principles of the
Altering Japanese criminal procedures to uphold
constitution.
constitutional principles such as the right to counsel, the right to

272.
See Cho, supra note 122, at 74 (noting that the Japanese Constitution
provided a vision for the evolution of the traditional criminal procedure system, but
that the socio-political force required to propel such change has not yet developed).
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 160.
273.
In order to have criminal justice in Japan meet the expectations of the people
and secure their trust hereafter, it is necessary to establish an appropriate
system, perceiving the demands of the times and society ... and respecting the
ideal of the guarantee of human rights set forth in the Constitution, including
the guarantee of the defense rights of the suspects and the defendants.

Id.
274.

Id. at 213.

Even after its implementation, the initial [lay judge] system should not be
regarded as fixed in stone. Rather, the actual circumstances of the system
should be constantly monitored and, bearing in mind the importance of
establishing the popular base, the system should be flexibly readjusted from a
broad viewpoint, as necessary.
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silence, and the presumption of innocence would require a broad
rethinking of Japan's restorative model of criminal justice. This is so,
because principles which uphold the presumption of innocence
necessarily perform a more adversarial function than the Japanese
275
system is currently geared for.
Because the Japanese system is so dependent upon obtaining
276
confessions as the first step in reintegrating offenders into society,
the system depends on the defendant's cooperation in order to start
the adjudicative process. 277 Enforcing constitutional rights to counsel
and to silence in the Japanese system would not encourage a
defendant to cooperate or to confess, but instead would encourage a
defendant to contest the charges against him. In short, none of these
constitutional rights seems compatible with a system in which the
rehabilitative process begins with confession. 278 Instead, because the
rights to counsel and to silence assist defendants in maintaining a
presumption of innocence, the full application of those rights in Japan
279
would infuse Japanese criminal justice with more adversarialism.
It is becoming increasingly apparent to the public that Japanese
criminal procedures cannot be reconciled with the Japanese
constitution. In past years the Japanese may have dutifully ignored
the discord between individual rights and police procedures.
However, recent trends indicate that Japan is coming to terms with
the fact that the police and the criminal are on opposite sides of the
280
criminal justice equation.
A. IncreasingAdversarialNature of Japanese CriminalJustice
Internationalization and government reforms may be causing
Japan to follow the Eastern European trend toward more adversarial

275.

Richard A. Leo, Miranda, Confessions, and Justice: Lessons For Japan?,in

THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS,

supra note 29, at 200, 212 (noting that Japan does not have an adversarial system of
criminal justice).
276.
Id. at 216 (noting the importance of confessions to police and prosecutors
not only for their evidentiary value, but because they are integral to the process of
rehabilitation).
277.
Id. (noting that in Japan an accused suspect is presumed guilty and he is
expected to confess and repent).
Takano, supra note 67, at 137 (noting that Japanese criminal justice could
278.
not work if those accused of crimes routinely exercised their constitutional rights).
See Leo, supra note 275, at 212 (noting that Miranda warnings can only
279.
succeed in an adversarial system).
See David T. Johnson, Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Japan, 36
280.
CRIME & JUST. 371, 412 (2007) [hereinafter Johnson, Crime and Punishment] (noting
that recent trends in Japanese law enforcement show that Japan is more focused on
strengthening its institutions of crime control than in the past, and that Japan is
moving away from a rehabilitative system toward a more Western retributive model).
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criminal justice.2 81 Because Japan's code-based system resembles
developing Continental European systems, 28 2 these nations may be
valuable models by which to forecast the direction of reform in Japan.
Rising adversarialism is a result of changing cultural attitudes and
the influence of international law. 28 3 As attitudes and values change
28 4
in societies, they are reflected in changes to domestic laws.
Declining public confidence in government and changing social
attitudes are empowering Eastern Europeans and taking power away
These bottom-up developments support
from the judiciary. 28 5
individuality and personal autonomy. 28 6 As Japan implements the
lay judge system, changing attitudes about the justice system may
hasten the movement towards a more adversarial brand of justice.
Public perception is the key to reforming Japanese criminal
justice, because perceptions demarcate the parameters that reform
initiatives will address. One perception signifying movement in the
adversarial direction is the changing view of crime in Japan, and
what the government has done in response. One expert argues that
statistical increases in the Japanese crime rate between the years
1992 and 2001 are grounded more in changes in police reporting
practices than in reality, 28 7 and that police have been using these

Van Kessel, supra note 29, at 227 (noting criminal justice trends in Europe
281.
that show a shift towards a more adversary-style method of adjudication, because of
international perspectives about criminal justice and shifting cultural attitudes about
the individual's relationship to government and society).
Id. at 243 (noting that Japan is becoming more open, more competitive, and
282.
more individualistic as a society).
Id. at 225-27, 234 (noting criminal justice trends in Europe that show a
283.
shift in emphasis from inquiry-style procedures towards a more adversary-style
method of adjudication, characterized by a shift in emphasis from the pretrial to the
trial phase, and a decreasing reliance on the accused as a source of testimonial
evidence). The author argues that the underlying causes of these trends are economic
integration in Europe, international perspectives about criminal justice and shifting
cultural attitudes about the individual's relationship to government and society.
284.
Id. at 235 (noting the cases of Italy and Spain, where domestic legislation
authorized a shift towards adversarial justice).
Id. at 237 (noting that dispersal of authority to the parties is one of the
285.
principle characteristics of adversary procedure, and is probably the result of diversity,
the realignment of political authority, and an increasingly powerful media).
286.
Id. (noting that individuality and personal autonomy are two traits that
"emphasize competition and accept the notion of winning and losing").
Johnson, Crime and Punishment, supra note 280, at 375-81 (noting the
287.
"new view" in Japan that crime is increasing, and that citizens are right to feel
insecure and right to demand more enforcement from politicians, but debunking the
myth by analyzing homicide, robbery, and larceny and finding that claims of a new
crime wave are exaggerated by changes in police reporting practices). But see Crime
Down Nationwide, YOMIURI SHIMBUN (ToKyo), Dec. 5, 2007 (citing lower crime rates
due to stronger police enforcement measures in the areas of street crimes, such as
bicycle theft and mugging). Johnson's argument is centered on the notion that
Japanese crime rates were artificially inflated to begin with, and that the statistics
never reflected reality. In this view, even if crime is falling as a result of upgraded
police enforcement initiatives, one might expect the police to use such favorable
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28 8
statistics as a mandate to increase law enforcement initiatives.
Police reports have affected public attitudes and politicians have used
justify new initiatives in order to deal with the
these perceptions28to
"crime problem." 9 In turn, Japanese perceptions about the "sharp
increase in crime" have led to the commercialization 290 and
politicization 291 of crime.

1.

Fear Factor: The New Orthodoxy

The politicization of crime has fueled anxieties, and it has
exacerbated public fears about the crime epidemic. 292 Media reports
increasingly focus on shocking crimes, and this has contributed to the
public discourse about the crime problem. 293 In this environment,
Japanese politicians have found that crime is a language that
everyone understands and a message that sells well. 294 More than
fifty Japanese municipalities have expressed interest in having
correctional facilities built in their regions, and one observer notes
that "prisons in Japan may be on the verge of becoming a growth
industry."295 The politicization of crime has also resulted in more
criminalization. 29 6 Also, the transformation of crime victims into a
favored constituency in public policy is increasingly visible in the

statistics to justify continued vigilance. Regardless of whether the crime rate has been
inflated or whether it has been genuinely decreasing, few if any of the types of crimes
discussed in the Yomiuri piece would be affected by increased police surveillance
initiatives such as wiretapping suspects' communications, discussed infra at notes 28794 and accompanying text. These initiatives indicate that authorities may indeed be
overreacting to the "crime problem."
288.
See Johnson, Crime and Punishment, supra note 280, at 375 (noting that
police reports and public surveys reference young people and foreigners as the source of
increased crime in Japan).
289.
Id. (noting that Japanese politicians are responding to the crime problem
with "get tough" campaigns).
Id. at 397-400 (noting that commercial crime control devices are selling in
290.
greater numbers; security systems sales are increasing at 20% annually; that other
items such as custom "panic rooms" and robotic sentries are being marketed; that
Japanese police are encouraging residents to install surveillance cameras that they can
use to access footage of crimes; and that the police use public money to help residents
lease these cameras).
Id. at 411-12 (noting that Japanese officials have exploited specific
291.
criminal events to gain more power).
292.
Id. at 412.
293.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 409 (noting politicians 'fish in the troubled waters' of public opinion
294.
in an effort to find law-and-order issues that will attract support").
295.
Id. at 383 (discussing the situation even further, the author also indicates
that Yamaguchi Prefecture elected to install Japan's first semi-private prison in 2007,
and that trading companies and securities firms are on board with the idea of private
prisons because they are "impervious to economic ups and downs").
See id. at 386-90 (noting the expansion of activities classified as crime and
296.
stepped up enforcement efforts).
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fabric of reform. 297 In this view the criminal justice system is being
298
warped to serve victims rather than to serve the public interest,
and this new mantra resonates with the government because it
justifies new initiatives 299 and enhances bureaucratic power.
2.

The Government Surfs the "New View" of Crime Wave

The Diet has acted on the "new view" of crime by passing
legislation such as the Basic Act on Crime Victims in 2004.300
According to this law, everyone in Japan has a higher probability of
becoming a crime victim, thus policies should be made from victims'
viewpoints in order to protect their rights. 30 1 Under the statute,
30 2
crime victims are empowered to take part in criminal procedures.
This law took effect in a June 2007 amendment to the Code of
Criminal Procedure that allows crime victims to question criminal
defendants at trial under the lay judge system. 30 3 Critics point out

297.
See id. at 400 (stating that the new orthodoxy requires police, prosecutors
and judges to consider the needs of crime victims more than in the past).
298.
See id. at 400 ("As victims move closer to center stage in Japan's criminal
process, the system's other actors are coming to see themselves more as service
providers for individual victims rather than as agents of the public interest.").
299.
See, e.g., LDP to Open Up Closed Juvenile Trials to Include Victims,
Bereaved, MAINICHI NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, at 2 (on file with author) (noting a Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) plan to allow victims or bereaved family members to attend
juvenile trials of teenagers who commit serious crimes as a response to growing
demands from victims).
300.
Basic Act on Crime Victims, Law No. 161 of 2004, translationavailable at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/datafbacv.pdf; see also Editorial, Assistance to
Crime Victims, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jpl
cgi-bined20071208a2.html (noting the important role of the National Network for
Victim Support, Zenkoku HigaishaShien Network, in enacting the 2004 basic law).
301.
Basic Act on Crime Victims, Law No. 161 of 2004, translation available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/datafbacv.pdf (see supplementary provision).
302.
See id. art. 18 (developing the system to expand participation
opportunities).
303.
See KEISHOHO, art. 292-2. Sections 2 through 9 provide for controls on the
statements of victims and witnesses. Section 2 requires that the prosecutor be informed
of the proposed statement, and the prosecutor must inform the court. Id. art. 292-2(2).
Judges, including lay judges, may then question the victim or witness to clarify the
statement. Id. art. 292-2(3). Persons involved with the case may also question the
victim or witness as to the statement after telling the presiding judge. Id. art. 292-2(4).
The presiding judge may limit victim or witness statements where they duplicate
previous statements or concern matters unrelated to the case or are unreasonable. Id.
art. 292-2(5). The court may opt for a document stating the victim's or witness's opinion
where circumstances make oral statements untenable. Id. art. 292-2(7). When a
document is to be utilized instead of an oral statement, the presiding judge must clarify
this matter on the date of trial, and if deemed reasonable the presiding judge shall read
aloud the statement or explain its meaning. Id. art. 292-2(8). The statement or
document may not constitute evidence for recognition of a criminal fact. Id. art. 2922(9). Under section 6, provisions 157-2, 157-3, and 157-4(1) apply where the victim or
witness "feels extreme anxiety or tension." Id. art. 157-2(1). Under those sections, the
victim or witness may be attended to by a suitable person to alleviate such anxiety or
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that as the focus shifts away from the rights of defendants, the
process of supporting the interests of victims increasingly pits their
needs against the rights of the offenders. 30 4 In this vein, support for
victims is transforming the Japanese trial process into a win-or-lose
proposition in which the competing interests of victim and defendant
are increasingly seen as polar opposites. 30 5 The win-or-lose dynamic
represents adversarialism and signifies a departure from the win-win
concept of rehabilitative justice.
Other legislation has also contributed to the transformation of
Japanese justice. In August 1999, Japan passed the Communications
Interception Act (CIA), 30 6 which allows investigators to tap electronic
communications of criminal suspects. 30 7 The bill was originally
intended to help the government battle organized crime, and it arose
as one of three bills passed for that purpose in 1999.308 The Act gives
the government authority to use wiretaps to investigate illegal
firearms, organized murder, and the smuggling of drugs and illegal
310
immigrants into Japan. 30 9 The opposition party resisted the bill
because of concerns that it would legitimize invasions of the right to
3 11
privacy.
Under this statute, law enforcement could use any information
obtained in an intercepted communication to detain a suspect and
subject him to questioning. 3 12 Japan has been characterized as an
"eavesdropping paradise," where surreptitious monitoring has been a

tension during the oral statement. Id.; see also Press Release, Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, New System Allows Crime Victims to Participate in Criminal Trials (July
1, 2007), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ enlactivities/meetings/070701.html
[hereinafter Victims Participate] (noting that this amendment became law, and that
crime victims and their bereaved families will be allowed to attend trials, question
defendants and witnesses, and demand punishment).
304.
Johnson, Crime and Punishment, supra note 280, at 400.
305.
Id.
306.
Hanzai Sosa no Tame no Tsushin Boju ni kansuru Horitsu
[Communications Interception Act], Law No. 137 of 1999, available at
http://www.ron.gr.jp/law/law/tu-bouju.htm [hereinafter Wiretap Act].
307.
Id.; see also Gilmer, supra note 268, at 895-96 (noting the passage of the
Communications Interception Act, which allowed investigators to wiretap telephone
conversations and communications of suspected criminals).
308.
See Toshikuni Murai, Critical Issues in the Lawmaking Policy of Japanese
Criminal Procedure: The Wiretap Act and the Adversary System at the PretrialStage,
in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS,

supra note 29, at 193, 193, 197 (saying that the first bill revised the Criminal Code to
encompass money laundering; the second bill extends enforcers' authority to use
wiretaps as an investigatory tool; and the third bill provided for the protection of
witnesses); see also Gilmer, supra note 268, at 897 (discussing Japan's passage of the
Communications Interception Act).
309.
Gilmer, supra note 268, at 899.
310.
See id. at 895 (noting that the Wiretap Act was "one of the most
controversial laws passed by the Diet in recent history").
311.
Id. at 915.
312.
Id. at 919.
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frequent occurrence, 313 and where no legal restrictions existed to
protect the public. 314 Yet, instead of restricting wiretapping, the Act
specifically authorizes law enforcement to spy on average citizens and
legalizes eavesdropping practices as long as they are carried out by
315
the police.
One concern is that the Act authorizes the police to engage in
unconstitutional investigative methods. 316 Article 35 of Japan's
constitution provides for a right to privacy. 317 Moreover, Article 21 of
Japan's constitution provides for freedom of speech and for the right
to secrecy of one's communications. 318 Because Japanese authorities
ignore the constitutional rights of criminal defendants under
detention and interrogation, 319 some fear that the Act could result in
constitutional violations of the right to privacy 320 and the right to
secrecy of one's communications. Skeptics may wonder what would
keep the police from violating these rights under the CIA when law
enforcement routinely ignores other constitutional protections such as

313.
See Hiroshi Matsubara, Japan an Eavesdropping Paradise, JAPAN TIMES,
July 7, 1999, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19990707a9.html
(noting that a lack of laws governing eavesdropping devices and their almost
ubiquitous existence has made Japan the most extensively bugged country in the
world, and that in conjunction with deliberations over the Wiretap Act, the government
discussed the notion of cracking down on eavesdropping by citizens as a supplementary
measure to the bill).
314.
See Murai, supra note 308, at 197 (noting that electronic monitoring
equipment is readily available in stores and that there are no legal measures to combat
eavesdropping).
315.
See Gilmer, supra note 268, at 919-20 (noting critics' fears that police will
use the law as a license to eavesdrop on private citizens as well as suspects).
316.
See id. at 895 (noting that the Wiretap Act could authorize illegal
transgressions of the constitutional right to privacy).
317.

The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects
against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except
upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing
the place to be search and the things to be seized ... (2) Each search or
seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent
judicial officer.

KENPO, art. 35.
318.
Id. art. 21 ("Freedom of assembly and of association as well as speech, press
and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. 2) No censorship shall be maintained,
nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.").
319.
See supra notes 106-18, 121-54, 172-94 and accompanying text (discussing
how the treatment of the criminally accused under interrogation and while in detention
is at odds with provisions of the Japanese Constitution).
320.
See Gilmer, supra note 268, at 915-17 (citing the Japanese courts' liberal
interpretations of the Police Duties Law that in effect elevate evidence, no matter how
obtained, above individual rights). The Police Duties Law authorizes law enforcement
to conduct searches when they feel criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 915. Gilmer
points to Japanese courts' treatment of the Police Duties Law as support for the idea
that courts will not enforce limits on the use of wiretaps under the Wiretap Act. See id.
at 917.
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the right to counsel or the right to silence. 321 Under this law, the
police could gain access to a private individual's communications, and
they could use the information gained to justify extensive
questioning.3 2 2 One observer notes that such fears are buttressed by
a 1986 case of illegal wiretapping in Kanagawa. 323 Despite a court
ruling awarding damages to the target of the electronic surveillance
3 24
in that case, the police deny that any wiretapping ever occurred.
Essentially, the CIA arms the police with the tools to cast a wider
investigative net-potentially invading peoples' privacy and
misidentifying innocents who could face inquisition by the
325
procuracy.
B. The Lay Judge System: Gateway to FullerReform?
Bureaucracies tend to grow over time, 326 and as they grow they
develop mission creep. 327 The short history of the CIA bears this out.
The law's mandate was to aid the government in controlling
organized crime. 328 Yet already there are reports of sharp increases
in the use of wiretaps in criminal investigations. 329 Rising public
awareness about police scandals and media stories about improper
police conduct decrease trust in the police. 330 Unpopular laws such as
the CIA only exacerbate this problem. As a result, people feel more

See id. at 918 (asserting that the police have powerful investigatory tools,
321.
which have been misused to such a large degree that there is a general feeling of public
distrust of the police).
322.
Id.
323.
Id. at 920 (saying that the Kanagawa police tapped the phone of
Communist Party leader Yasuo Ogata, who was awarded four million yen in damages
by the Tokyo High Court); see also Editorial, Wiretapping Is a Two-Edged Tool, JAPAN
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
available at
31,
1999,
TIMES,
May
ed19990531al.html.
Gilmer, supra note 268, at 920.
324.
325.
See id. at 895 (noting wiretapping is effective in combating organized crime
because it allows law enforcement to target those who control organized crime but have
remained beyond the reach of the law). The concern is that wiretapping is an equally
effective method of intruding into the lives of private persons, whose innocent
conversations may be misconstrued by police, or used as a pretext for an investigative
"fishing expedition." See generally id. at 900-01.
See Jones, supra note 28, at 364-65 (noting that the Japanese court system
326.
is a "highly trained and specialized ... bureaucracy that is focused on preserving its
own authority").
"Mission creep" refers to the expansion of bureaucratic authority beyond
327.
the institution's original function.
328.
Murai, supra note 308, at 193.
329.
See Record Number of Wiretaps in 2006, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007O2l7a9.html (noting that in
2006, police used a record-breaking number of authorized wiretaps).
330.
See Gilmer, supra note 268, at 919-20 (citing to various police scandals and
with a resulting drop in the public's trust of the police, and noting that the police are
able to keep their internal affairs secret).
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suspicious about the police, and some may view them as adversaries
rather than as public servants.
The lay judge system itself signifies heightened adversarialism.
By requiring ordinary citizens to sit in judgment, the system will
require lay judges to view the prosecution and the defense as
opponents on different sides of the justice coin. Japanese criminal
trials simply will not be able to maintain their traditional guiltconfirmation function 331 without undermining the integrity of the lay
judge system.
True civic participation will require the active
engagement of Japanese citizens in the adjudicatory process, and this
will not be accomplished if lay judges do no more than confirm dossier
evidence as Japanese judges currently do. 3 3 2 Moreover, by increasing

public participation in the justice system, the lay judge system will
help to educate the general public about criminal justice and about

the legal system. 333 This will energize the citizenry 334 by generating
more thought about rights, and by encouraging more media coverage

of legal issues. In response to public hysteria about increasing crime,
the Japanese government has begun instituting new programs and

has passed legislation designed to fight crime.

In the process, the

3 35
character of Japanese criminal justice may be changing.

In theory, democracies represent the will of the people through
the voting process and through jury service. 336
A democracy's
criminal justice system should reflect democratic principles, which

331.
See Hirano, supra note 6, at 129 (arguing that Japanese courts do not
perform the function of deciding guilt or innocence but rather operate to confirm guilt);
see also Seuss, supra note 84, at 316 (stating that "courts play a guilt-confirmation role
rather than a guilt-determination role").
332.
See Ishimatsu, supra note 6, at 146-47 (detailing the system of justice/trial
by dossier).
333.
See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan'sPetit Quasi-Jury and Grand
Jury Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay
ParticipatoryExperience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 315, 316 (2007)
(noting that contrary to past research indicating that Japanese citizens share a strong
sense of obedience to legal authority, the experience of civic participation has increased
the public's level of legal consciousness and willingness to participate in the legal
system).
334.
See id. (discussing the increased enthusiasm of Japanese citizens to
participate in the legal system).
335.
See Johnson, Crime and Punishment, supra note 280, at 400 (suggesting
that a decline in Japan's rehabilitative ideal may cause changes in the crime field).
336.
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 173 (Knopf 1945)
(1835).
[T]he people appoint the legislative and the executive power and furnish the
jurors who punish all infractions of the laws. The institutions are democratic,
not only in their principle, but in all their consequences; and the people elect
their representatives directly . . . in order to ensure their dependence. The
people are therefore the real directing power.

2008]

TESTING IAPAN'S CONVICTIONS

place power in the hands of the people. 337 Such principles are
embodied in the Japanese constitution 33 8 and are alluded to in the
JSRC Report, 339 but Japanese law enforcement authorities routinely
violate constitutional principles. If Japan intends to legitimize its
justice system by incorporating ordinary citizens into the process of
adjudicating crime, the constitutional tension between law
enforcement practices and the rights of criminal defendants must be
addressed. Ultimately, the Japanese people may demand no less
340
than adherence to the precepts of their constitution.
As in every well-ordered society, Japanese police represent
governmental authority. Yet they employ methods that suppress the
constitutional rights of criminal suspects and defendants. 34 1 The new
lay judge system places Japan's criminal justice system at a
crossroads and it challenges the government and the public to
respond. Current reform initiatives at best preserve the status quo
while paying homage to the grail of reform, 342 and at worst ignore the
shortcomings and dislocations of the current system that innocent
criminal defendants are forced to endure.
Japan's adversarial shift may also be hastened by an increasing
343
supply of lawyers and more use of the courts to resolve disputes.
The environment is ripe for change, and the lay judge system will
provide the infrastructure for fuller reforms 344 if Japanese people are
willing to embrace the new system. Pressures from the Japanese
public to ensure that criminal justice practices accord with the

337.
See id. at 282 ("Trial by jury... [is] ...an eminently republican element in
the government .. .in that it places the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed... and not in the government.").
338.
KENPO, ch. III.
339.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 843 (noting that the JSRC Report urges
citizens to "break out of the consciousness of being a governed object and ... become a
governing subject, with autonomy and bearing social responsibility" (quoting JSRC
Recommendations, supra note 13, at 127)).
340.
See Leah Ambler, The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the
Quasi-Jury System (Saiban-In Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 1, 23 (2007) (arguing that the lay judge system will place capital
punishment "squarely within the public domain" and provide the people with the tools
to abolish it).
341.
See generally Murai, supra note 308.
342.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 850 (noting the Japanese concepts of tatemae
and honne, two principles that connote the official version of how things are-the
desired appearance-and the truth of the situation, respectively).
343.
See Schumann, supra note 2, at 519 (noting that the increase in the
number of lawyers, the fact that more people are willing to use the courts to resolve
disputes, and structural changes such as the revised Administrative Procedures Law
and the revised Civil Procedure Code, are making Japanese law and society more
adversarial in nature).
344. See Herrmann, supra note 141, at 132 (noting that lay judges provide
democratic legitimization of the criminal justice process and that they guarantee that
justice is administered in a way that can be understood by the average citizen).
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constitution will either foment changes to Japanese
procedure or signal a crisis of governmental legitimacy.

criminal

V. SUPPLEMENTS TO REFORM

Under the Lay Assessor's Act, the new lay judge system is set to
take effect by May 2009. 34 5 Japan can get ahead of a potential
governmental legitimacy crisis by incorporating several proposals to
coincide with the launch of the lay judge system or to be applied
shortly thereafter.
Japan's government should take concrete
measures to ensure that the lay judge system will provide more than
just the appearance of public participation. The suggestions that
follow will do more to increase trust in the legal system and to
stimulate participation in government than will current reform
initiatives.
A. Videotaping Confessions
One of the best ways to ensure that lay participation in Japanese
criminal trials will be valuable and meaningful is to ensure the
objectivity of the evidence that lay judges will be asked to evaluate at
trial. This will encourage lay judges about the value of their roles in
the new system, and it will support their fact-finding function.
Because the camera does not lie, all interrogations should be
videotaped.
Videotaping interrogations would help achieve the aim of
eliciting reliable, truthful confessions because it would provide a
reviewable and objective record of criminal interrogations. 346 Experts
note that this would benefit all parties concerned-police,
prosecutors, defendants, lay judges, and the public. 347 The JSRC
proposal to implement a new system of written records of criminal
interrogations 348 is insufficient because written records are open to
manipulation and human error. 349 In addition to creating an

345.
See Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 234 ("The law is to come into force
within five years of its enactment, i.e. before June 2009.").
346.
Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 9.
347.
See, e.g., Leo, supra note 275, at 212 (noting that videotaping is nonadversarial because it does not tip the balance of power in favor of the prosecution or
the defense, but merely preserves the truth of the interrogation).
348.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 169 (suggesting that accuracy
and objectivity of such records would be achieved if the matters to be recorded are
specified on a form and the record is stored safely under a control system that prevents
anyone from altering it at a later time).
349.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 8-9 (noting that
with no objective records of an interrogation, the police are free to reconstruct what
occurred to advance their case-building and conviction goals, a process that leads too
often to the fabrication, corruption, and concealment of the truth); see also Gilmer,
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objective and reviewable record of interrogations, videotaping
interrogations would force authorities to adopt other methods of
obtaining confessions or to obtain evidence in a more balanced and
fairer way. This would help put an end to coercion and would do
more than any other measure to bring Japanese police practices in
350
line with the constitutional rights of defendants.
In addition, videotaping interrogations would also mean that
investigators could no longer discard evidence that does not conform
to their theories about the truth of their cases. This would make
more exculpatory evidence available to defense counsel, because a
videotaped record would help to nullify the negative effect of the
Japanese discovery rule that requires an adverse party to know the
existence and identity of a piece of evidence before requesting it. Any
exculpatory evidence gleaned during interrogation would be instantly
"discovered" when the tapes are reviewed by defense counsel.
Moreover, videotaping interrogations would preclude any such
evidence from being discarded by investigators. Finally, a videotape
of the interrogation would cause Japanese courts to either more fully
apply the exclusionary rule, or to at least be more skeptical of the
prosecution's dossier. Courts would have to think carefully before
simply accepting the dossier into evidence.
There may be some positive movement regarding videotaped
confessions. The Ministry of Justice has conducted tests on the use of
videotaped confessions and portions of interrogations to ensure that
any confessions were voluntary. 351 However, partial videotaping can
be misleading because it does not record the entire interrogation.
Therefore, partial videotaping cannot provide objective insight as to
the conditions under which a confession is obtained. In early 2007, a
Tokyo district court judge noted this weakness and expressed doubt
about the evidentiary value of a partially videotaped confession
during a murder trial.3 52 Partial recording is insufficient, and it is
potentially more dangerous than a written record because such
evidence is too misleading to lay judge panels consisting of ordinary

supra note 268, at 919 (discussing that the new wiretap laws allow investigators to act
on their hunches).
350.
See Leo, supra note 275, at 214 (noting that taping interrogations will reign
in zealous interrogators and encourage fairer treatment for all suspects during
interrogation); id. at 212 (noting that videotaping "is a non-adversarial policy reform
that, unlike the creation or restriction of constitutional rights, does not structurally
alter the balance of advantage between the prosecution and the defense," but instead is
a medium for "preserving the truth of the interrogations" and any resulting
confessions).
351.
Kamiya, supranote 61.
352.
See Jun Hungo, Murder-for-Insurance Gets 25 Years, DVD Confession or
No, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin~nn20071011a4html (noting that the judge argued that the partial tape could only
provide evidence supporting the claims of the prosecutors and could not serve as
substantial evidence about the underlying crime).
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citizens. Lay judges may accept a partially taped interrogation and
confession without considering what set of factors caused the
individual to confess in the first place. Under the plan adopted by the
National Police Agency in April 2008, partial taping is authorized,
but its main use is to be for cases where suspects retract their
confessions at trial. 353 As a result, the limited videotaping measures
adopted by the police help prosecutors get confessions admitted into
evidence at trial 354 and do little to ensure that the interrogation
process is conducted fairly, or that it accords with constitutional
rights.
A better proposal is to videotape the entire interrogation of a
suspect or a defendant to ensure that the evidence is objective and
complete. While it would be overly time-consuming to require lay
judges to view every moment of interrogation, the existence of such a
record, which could be reviewed by defense counsel, would go a long
way in upholding the constitutional rights of those accused of crimes.
Moreover, the mere knowledge that interrogations are videotaped
would help to deter any physical or mental coercion by police.
A Democratic Party of Japan bill stipulated that all
interrogations should be recorded on videotape and that any written
statements used against the defendant must be accompanied by video
and audio recordings. 355 A more recent bill in the House of
Councilors that calls for complete recordings of interrogations is
unlikely to be enacted because the controlling coalition in the
Without the
Japanese House of Representatives opposes it. 3 5 6
clarification that the entire interrogation and confession should be
video-recorded to avoid the problem of staged videotaped confessions,
Japan is left with a system that carries a strong possibility of
misleading lay judges as to the circumstances surrounding a
defendant's confession. The presence of counsel during questioning
would help to ensure that the video documentation is carried out
properly, but under current Japanese procedures, defense attorneys
357
are not allowed to attend interrogations.
B. The Right to Counsel Must Be Truly Upheld
In order to increase trust in the system and to stimulate
participation in government, Japan should work to ensure that the

Police to Film, supra note 155 (noting the formalization of the plan and that
353.
lawyers criticize the system as not making interrogations more transparent).
354.
See Upper House, supra note 152 (stating that prosecutors' recordings of
interrogations will "help establish the credibility of suspects' depositions").

355.

DPJSubmits Bill to Have All Interrogationsof Suspects Recorded, YOMIURI

SHIMBUN (TOKYO), Dec. 5, 2007.
356.
Upper House, supra note 152.
357.
Foote, Paternalism,supra note 85, at 338.
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constitutional right to counsel is not violated. Ideally, the right
should be interpreted in the Miranda tradition. 358 Implementing a
Japanese Mirandarule would be extremely problematic for Japanese
criminal justice359 because, even though Japan is adapting to a more
adversarial justice system, inquisitorial criminal procedures remain
unchanged.
The Code of Criminal Procedure limits how the
360
constitution applies in the handling of criminal suspects.
Current methods of compelling confessions from suspects do not
reflect a system worthy of a democratic society, and maintaining any
such practices will not create more faith in the justice system.
Accordingly, practices that preclude or limit a criminal defendant
from meeting with defense counsel should be abolished. Practices
such as daiyo kangoku and bekken taiho offend the principle of
fairness, and they should play no part in the adjudication of crime in
a modern democratic country. Both practices serve either to hinder
or to prevent the constitutional right to counsel. Innocent defendants
in Japan essentially have no right to counsel because the criminal
36 1
justice system refuses to enforce it.
The JSRC Report recommends establishing an active defense
bar, 362 but there are no guidelines setting forth how defense
attorneys will be allowed to interact with criminal defendants. There
simply is no codified legal apparatus to alter the overwhelming power
the government holds over the criminally accused. Moreover, while

358.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding the privilege
against self-incrimination so important that procedural safeguards must be employed
to protect that privilege).
359.
See Leo, supra note 275, at 210-12 (arguing that because Japan does not
have an adversarial system of criminal justice, applying Miranda rights to block
confession would be inappropriate because it would be perceived as an impediment to
the pursuit of truth and to the moral catharsis of suspects who begin taking
responsibility for their crimes by confessing).
360.
See generally Victims Participate, supra note 303 (discussing various
safeguards for victims); Murai, supra note 308 (discussing the Constitutional
protections for wiretapping).
361.
See Takano, supra note 67, at 137 (recounting that "[n]o system worth
preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer,
he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system." (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 478,
490 (1964)).
362.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 165.
In order to ensure the fairness of the criminal justice system, it is critical to
properly protect the rights of the suspects and defendants. For that purpose, it
is especially important to effectively secure the right to counsel ....
[A) public
defense system for suspects should be introduced and a continuous defense
structure covering both the suspect stage and the defendant stage should be
established.
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Japan is beginning to produce more lawyers, 363 it is questionable
whether many of the new lawyers will be attracted to criminal
defense work. 364 The extremely high criminal conviction rate, the
limited financial rewards of a career as a defense attorney, and
societal disdain for defense attorneys all reduce the chances that new
lawyers will be attracted to criminal defense work. 365 Going forward,
it appears that at least the supply of new lawyers will be sufficient to
staff the defense bar system if they choose to engage in that type of
work. 366 Moreover, a great deal of education and training will be
required to bring Japan's lawyers up to the task of representing
criminal defendants in adversarial trials. 36 7 Most Japanese defense
attorneys lack the oral advocacy and presentation skills to argue
understood by
cases effectively and in a way that can be easily
3 68
ordinary citizens who will function as lay judges.
Without concrete legal provisions regulating the interaction of
defense attorneys and criminal defendants in support of the right to
counsel, current law enforcement practices that arbitrarily limit and
disrupt attorney-client meeting opportunities will not change. If
there is no change to the manner in which the right to counsel is

363.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 867 (noting that Japan has decided to double
the number of lawyers, prosecutors, and judges by 2018, by implementing changes in
the bar passage rate and establishing over seventy new U.S.-style professional law
schools).
364.
Id. at 867-68.
365.
See Foote, Reflections, supra note 148, at 33 (noting the low compensation
for defense attorneys in Japan; court appointed counsel normally receive fixed fees of
65,000 yen, or approximately $500, for a case with three trial sessions); see also Wilson,
supra note 1, at 867-68 (noting that defense attorneys are viewed as protectors of
Japan's public enemies and have a poor reputation because they represent alleged
criminals, noting also that they are underpaid).
366.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 165 (suggesting the possibility
of hiring full-time lawyers or contracting with individual lawyers or firms).
367.
See James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law
Schools: Putting the Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 303,
316 (noting that U.S.-style law schools are adapted to a common law adversarial legal
system which prizes advocacy, but that Japan has different traditions); see also
Miyazawa, supra note 1, at 115-16 (noting that some new law graduates are praised by
the Japanese media as Japan's brightest stars to lead the country into the future, but
have trouble finding books in the law library, and that students view a law degree as a
business credential, and are relieved upon graduation because they no longer have to
study law); Wilson, supra note 1, at 868 (calling for Japan's government to expand legal
aid and public defender systems, and for law schools, the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, and the Legal Research and Training Institute to expand practical
training activities to increase exposure to trial advocacy and to improve the skills of
Japanese lawyers).
368.
Lawyers to Polish Speaking Skills/JFBA Plans Seminar to Learn Defense
Skills from U.S. Experts, YOMIURI SHIMBUN (TOKYO), Dec. 12, 2007 (noting that a
defense lawyer skills seminar was planned because of the Japan Federation of Bar
Association's recognition that defense attorneys' presentation skills lag behind those of
prosecutors and that the government has been conducting practical training seminars
for prosecutors since April 2006).
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carried out, Japanese law enforcement will remain insulated from the
reform process, and in some sense the police will remain above the
constitution.3 6 9
Maintaining
unreviewable
police
practices
undermines the concept of representative government and individual
freedom. It also undermines current reform initiatives that are
designed to create faith in the system and to improve Japanese
democracy, because it leaves great power in the hands of the state, to
the detriment of the wrongly accused. Criminal defendants deserve
their constitutional right to counsel and democracy demands it.
C. Victims and Their Families Should Not Be Allowed
to Question Defendants at Trial
Current proposals to uphold victim's rights undercut the goal of
increasing trust in the legal system. Recent concern for victims'
rights37 0 is forcing Japanese criminal justice in the adversarial
direction.3 71 Victims' rights will play a part in the lay judge system
under provisions in the Basic Act on Crime Victims and under the
amended Code of Criminal Procedure. 372 However, allowing victims
and their families to question defendants at trial is not advisable and
the practice should be scrapped before the implementation of the lay
judge system.
In the interest of advancing a more complete justice system, it
seems fair to take victims' feelings into account. However, the
institutionalization of victims' rights as part of the trial process will
not serve the system well. Japanese courts have shown a readiness
to consider victims' feelings in sentencing decisions, 3 73 and this is
perhaps the appropriate stage for victims and their families to be
heard.
The Lay Assessor's Act provides that lay judges are

369.
Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 13 (arguing that under
current conditions, justice reform will not produce a police force that is governed by the
rule of law, as under the present system there are no mechanisms of accountability and
transparency to check police activities).
370.
Johnson, Crime and Punishment, supra note 280, at 400.
371.
Id. at 385 n.19; see also Van Kessel, supra note 29, at 243 (discussing the
change toward a more individualistic society and a more open economy, two factors
which form the foundations of the adversary system).
372.
See KEISHOHO, art. 292-2 (noting various provisions); see also Victims
Participate, supra note 303 (noting that the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
victims and their families will have the opportunity to ask questions of criminal
defendants at trial).
373.
See, e.g., Court Adds Time to Teen's Murder Rap, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 26,
2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071026a1.html (noting
that in increasing the prison sentence of a teenage murder suspect, the presiding judge
made statements indicating that the original sentence was too light because of the
nature of the crime and the feelings of the victim's family).
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"entrusted to decide freely based on the strength of the evidence.1 37 4
However, including victims' subjective feelings at trial will not help
lay judges reach objective determinations based on evidence.
Allowing victims and their families to question defendants at trial
threatens to undermine the fairness of the trial proceeding because it
could interfere with objective fact-finding and because it could
375
adversely affect the rights of criminal defendants to a fair trial.
Impressionable lay judges will be hard-pressed to remain objective as
they sit alongside professional judges throughout the course of a
criminal trial, 376 and their judgment should not be clouded by the
emotional content that crime victims will bring to the trial
377
proceedings.
Moreover, the Lay Assessor's Act provides that the lay judges
may question victims after victims have made statements to the
court, but there is no language in the statute limiting the types of
questions that lay judges can ask those victims. 378 Amendments to
the Code of Criminal Procedure that provide the court with advance
notice of statements made by victims 3 79 will not preclude the
prejudicial effect of having lay judges probe victims' subjective
Allowing victims to make
feelings about the crime at trial.
statements and allowing lay judges to ask questions about those
statements during trial presents a real danger of prejudicing criminal
defendants.

See Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 268-69 (noting that under Article
374.
62 of the Lay Assessor's Act, both professional and lay judges are to decide cases based
on the strength of the evidence).
375.
Victims Participate, supra note 303; see also Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, Opinions on System for Direct Participation of Crime Victims in Criminal
Trials, May 1, 2007, available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/enlactivities/statements/
070501.html [hereinafter Opinions on Victims] (noting possible reasons for opposing
the system, including "hav[ing] an adverse effect on defense of defendants").
376.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 853 (discussing safeguards to ensure that lay
judges are not dominated by the professional judges on the jury panel).
377.
See Stuart Biggs, Critics: Lay Judges May Issue More Death Sentences,
JAPAN TIMES, Sep. 11, 2007, at 3 (noting the comments of anti-death penalty activist
Nobuto Hosaka, who argues that "[v]ictims will be able to make emotional pleas to the
court, with lay judges thrust into a role of hearing the most heinous crimes," and
noting the results of a June 3, 2007, mock trial in which audience members wanted the
accused to receive a longer sentence than was decreed); see also Masami Ito, Victim
Participationin Trials Risky, Experts Say, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070330a3.html; Opinions on Victims, supra
note 375.
378.
See Anderson & Saint, supra note 32, at 267-68 (showing that under
Article 58 of the Lay Assessor's Act, lay judges may question victims about their
statements at trial, but there is no provision requiring lay judges to obtain the
permission of the chief judge before doing so, as is the case under Articles 56 and 57,
which pertain to situations in which lay judges would ask questions of witnesses).
379.
See KEISHOHO, art. 292-2(2) (providing that victims' statements will be
prefaced by notification to the presiding judge).
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The incorporation of this procedure elevates victims in a way
that could be detrimental to defendants' rights. Victims' statements
may detract from the integrity of trial proceedings by transforming
trials into retributive proceedings that champion victims at the
expense of criminal defendants' constitutional rights.38 0 Assuaging
victims' emotions may be politically popular, but subjugating the
constitutional right to an impartial tribunal for such reasons is
misguided. Court procedures should not assist in or otherwise engage
in advocacy for either side in a criminal case. Instead, they should
reflect a balanced approach to deciding facts. Allowing victims to
question defendants mocks the presumption of innocence. Moreover,
supporting victims in this way is out of character with Japanese legal
traditions because it is a departure from the spirit of benevolent
paternalism and the rehabilitative approach to justice. Incredibly,
while current government reforms respond to public pressure to
support crime victims, government ears remain closed to similar
pressures regarding the need to uphold defendants' constitutional
rights. If Japanese justice is evolving, it should do so more fully, so
that the system works for all parties and not just for a favored
constituency.
By incorporating victims' feelings into the trial proceedings, the
Lay Assessor's Act threatens to prejudice the rights of criminal
defendants and to disrupt the flow of trial proceedings. 381 Victim
participation should be limited to the sentencing phase only, and even
Any other
then it should be limited to making statements.
participation is simply too prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.
D. Acquittals Should Be Final
Maintaining the koso appeal is detrimental to the new system
because it undermines the authority of the lay judges. Other than
voting in public elections, participation in jury trials is probably the
single most important way that ordinary citizens participate in the
democratic process.3 8 2 By ensuring that the decisions of lay judges
are respected, Japan would prove its commitment to democracy and
elevate its citizens accordingly. 38 3 However, the current system of

380.
KENPO, art. 37, para. 1 ("In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.").
See Opinions on Victims, supra note 375.
381.
See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Jury Reform for the 21st Century: A Judge's
382.
Perspective, 20 CRIM. JUST. 32, 32 (2005) ("[J]ury service in our federal and state
judicial systems is absolutely essential to ensure the proper functioning of our
democracy, just as important as our voting for elected officials.").
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 336, at 283-84 ("Now, the institution of
383.
the jury raises the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the bench of judges.
The institution of the jury consequently invests the people, or that class of citizens with
the direction of society."). But see Richard 0. Lempert, The Internationalizationof Lay
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koso appeals is to remain in place, and this could mitigate the value
of having a lay judge system altogether. If the lay judge system is to
be taken seriously, then maintaining the koso appeal is a mistake,
because second-guessing lay judges' determinations threatens to
undermine the legitimacy of citizen participation in criminal trials.38 4
If the government is not capable of proving its case under the
current approach, which features a system of dossier justice in which
the prosecution holds almost all of the procedural cards, 38 5 it is hard
to see why an appeal by the prosecution in the rare event of an
acquittal would be necessary. According to the JSRC, "even when
saiban-in participate, there is a danger of a mistaken verdict or a
mistaken judgment with regard to the sentence. 38 6 Since koso
appeals may be based on the grounds of an error in fact-finding or in
sentencing,38 7 maintaining koso appeals signals the government's
expectation that lay judges will sometimes make fact-finding errors
or impose improper sentences. Current reforms will not balance the
power disparity between the government and the accused, and they
will not affect the appellate process in any meaningful way.
Simply creating more lawyers and instituting a lay judge system
for criminal trials is not going to change the criminal conviction rate
because the scope of judicial reform has not included any significant
modification of criminal procedures.
At the very least, if the
government's power to appeal an acquittal is to remain in place, lay
judges should be allowed to participate at that level as well. 388 This
is particularly true where appellate courts opt for de novo review.
Excluding lay judges from appellate proceedings would signal that

Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
477, 480-81 (2007) (arguing that juries are not essential to democracy, but that juries
support democracy because they are not compatible with authoritarian government).
384.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 855 (arguing that confidence in lay judges'
authority and worth should not be undermined).
385.
See Foote, Reflections, supra note 148, at 32 (noting the broad exceptions to
the right to silence and right to access an attorney; the limited recognition that
Japanese courts accord to the exclusionary rule; the various exceptions to the hearsay
rule; and, the relatively few weapons that Japanese defense lawyers have to confront
the procuracy at trial as indications of the prosecution's dominant position in Japanese
criminal justice).
386.
JSRC Recommendations, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that the report
called for further studies as to the composition of the judicial body for a koso appeal but
did not recommend giving the determinations of lay judges the stamp of finality with
regard to an acquittal in a criminal case).
387.
See Outline, supra note 51 (stating that grounds for a koso appeal include
excessive severity or leniency of the sentence and an error in fact-finding).
388.
See Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 27, at 117 (noting that if the
determinations of lay juries are not respected, the lay function in the legal system-to
bring lay insight into the verdict-is undermined, and arguing that the concept of lay
participation is not undermined where rights to appeal provide review at another lay
tribunal).
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the lay judges arrived at the wrong verdict the first time around, and
that citizen participation is neither valid nor respected.
The government's power to appeal criminal acquittals plainly
undermines the authority of the lay judge system. 38 9 The power to
appeal criminal acquittals only enhances the government's power. It
also indicates that the government does not trust lay judge panels
with the power to render final decisions. 390 If citizens see that the
government does not respect the lay judge system, then there is little
reason for them to conclude that they should respect it either, or that
their participation matters in a system that doesn't respect their
decisions. The larger question many Japanese might begin to ask is
to what extent are the people really represented in a system that does
not even respect the determinations of citizen juries?
This outcome would mean that Japan's legal reforms will have
failed to achieve their goals, because it would mean that people have
less respect for government and less trust in the justice system.
Japan should fully consider what implications current reforms will
have for democracy and for governmental legitimacy. Japan has
jumped in with both feet regarding its jury system, and the system
should uphold the decisions of the lay judge panels. The foregoing
supplements to the reform agenda will arm Japanese criminal justice
with a renewed legitimacy by safeguarding the rights of criminal
defendants and reassuring Japanese citizens that the new jury
system has been carefully crafted and that its decisions will be
respected.
VI. CONCLUSION

The lay judge system highlights the challenges Japan faces as it
struggles to reconcile its modern constitution with its cultural and
legal traditions. No doubt the system will have a large impact on the
course of future reforms to Japanese criminal justice. Implementing
the suggestions raised in this Article would help provide Japan with a
criminal justice system worthy of its constitution and its democratic
form of government.
Unfortunately, legal reforms as they are
currently structured will not fulfill the goals established by the JSRC.

389.
See Wilson, supra note 1, at 856 ("If lay jury determinations are
consistently challenged and overturned by a panel of career judges, this has the
potential of undermining confidence in the jury system and frustrating the public's
belief in the value of its service.").
390.
See Bloom, supra note 11, at 51 (noting that Japan's choice of a mixed jury
system indicated an inherent distrust in "the average Japanese citizen's ability to
effectively decide legal issues," and that while "Japan wants to make its judicial system
more understandable to its citizens, it is not prepared to entrust decisions systems
solely to them").
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Rising - public awareness of the discord between the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants and existing criminal
391
It will
procedure could provoke a governmental legitimacy crisis.
be important for Japan to prevent that day from arriving by
developing and implementing top-down initiatives to manage reforms
and to bring Japanese criminal procedure into line with the
constitution, because reforms like the lay judge system are going to
result in bottom-up pressure to do so. Presently, Japanese criminal
justice reform is failing the Japanese people because it does not
adequately address the constitutional rights of Japanese citizens.
By empowering the Japanese people, the new system could
improve Japanese criminal justice and strengthen Japanese
democracy. By exposing the public to the excesses of the current
system, the lay judge system will put Japanese criminal procedures
in the crosshairs of public and constitutional scrutiny. Once the new
system is launched, Japan may face significant public pressure to
uphold the constitution and maintain the dignity of its citizens
through criminal procedures that accord with individual rights,
constitutional principles, and democratic governance. 392 However,
that degree of change will require a deeper inquiry into the
investigative stages of Japanese criminal procedures, and this does
not seem to be on the government's reform agenda. Creative law and
policy making before the lay judge system is implemented would pave
the way for a smoother transition to a system that involves public
participation in justice. The burden is ultimately on the Japanese
people to ensure that the rule of law finally takes hold in Japan, or to
resign themselves to living in a nation in which democracy does not
truly exist.

391.
See Hamano, supra note 252, at 484 (noting that constitutionalism in
Japan is fragile and will not withstand an unexpected political crisis).
392.
See Johnson, Justice System Reform, supra note 24, at 14 ("The best
comparative research on justice system reform demonstrates that changes are most
successful when they are driven from the bottom up by actors in civil society, not when
they are top down.").

